Framed Portrayals : Printed media representations of Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia (2016-2018) by Falcão, Pedro
  
 
 
Framed Portrayals - Printed media 
representations of Indigenous Peoples in 
Bolivia (2016-2018) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pedro Miguel Falcão Luís 
Master’s Degree Programme in Intercultural Encounters 
Area and Cultural Studies, Latin American Studies 
University of Helsinki 
May 2020 
  
  
 
 
 
Tiedekunta – Fakultet – Faculty 
 Faculty of Arts 
Koulutusohjelma – Utbildningsprogram – Degree Programme 
Intercultural Encounters 
Opintosuunta – Studieinriktning – Study Track  
Latin American Studies 
Tekijä – Författare – Author 
 Pedro Miguel Falcão Luís 
Työn nimi – Arbetets titel – Title 
Framed Portrayals - Printed media representations of Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia (2016-2018) 
 
Työn laji – Arbetets art – Level 
 Pro gradu - Masters 
Aika – Datum – Month and year 
 May 2020 
Sivumäärä– Sidoantal – Number of pages 
 99 
 
Tiivistelmä – Referat – Abstract 
 
In the past few decades, media has assumed an increasingly important role in shaping social and political 
understandings of the world. This is true across the world and its importance is magnified whenever the society it 
depicts is one of imbalances and inequalities. Such is the case in Bolivia, where centuries of colonialism, 
exploitation, discrimination, and injustices have created an immense gap between the Indigenous majority and a 
criollo minority, across all aspects of social, economic, and political life.  
After Evo Morales’ ascent to the presidency in 2006, Indigenous Peoples became the archetype for national 
citizenry, in a sharp contrast with their image under much of Bolivia’s history as a country. After the refounding of 
the nation as the Plurinational State of Bolivia in 2009, Indigenous Peoples were given a sociopolitical emphasis 
befitting of their representativeness, a volte-face contested by many. 
Coupled with these great changes in Bolivian society was the media (and particularly online media) growth 
registered in the last few decades. Its role as a political watchdog and as a social tone-setter became exponentially 
magnified, especially in its portrayal of Indigenous Peoples, no longer a marginal sociopolitical player in Bolivia 
but at the front and centre of national politics. 
This study analyses how Bolivian media portrays the country’s Indigenous Peoples in its online publications. This 
research focused on the second half of Evo Morales’ third term in office, when the new role of the indigenous 
person as a citizenship archetype had already been modestly consolidated. This study focuses on four distinct 
newspapers, relying on content analysis and framing analysis of articles dealing with and representing Indigenous 
Peoples as a methodology. The four newspapers were chosen either for their size and importance (El Deber, La 
Razón, Página Siete) or their political affiliation with the State (Cambio). 
As vehicles of information, the publications analysed convey heavily biased stances, widening the gap between one 
side and the other in an already deeply divided society like Bolivia’s. This polarisation acts as a tool of division, 
stoking flames of conflict and eroding the fertile middle grounds of dialogue, debate and compromise. Some media 
still portrays Indigenous Peoples as ossified relics of a pre-Columbian past, relying on binary oppositions between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous, others discredit differences under the guise of mestizaje, while some focus on 
Indigenous Peoples’ agency to highlight what has been achieved and how their own volition can shape the course 
of their social, economic, and political path. 
Indigenous Peoples’ representations in Bolivia are, therefore, quite divergent, even amongst bigger and mainstream 
outlets, creating their own kind of echo chamber; depending on the media consumed and the sociopolitical 
predispositions of the readers, two quite divergent portrayals are real and coexist side by side. This very 
contradiction could be an object of future studies, in an attempt to study what is the role of the media in broadening 
social divides. This is especially true in a society like Bolivia, where the differences between the “haves” and the 
“have-nots” are stark and the media is openly and partially biased, enacting a role that is more opinion-based and 
less informative than the common canons of journalistic objectivity. 
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1 Introduction 
The present Master’s thesis analyses the online publications of four Bolivian newspapers 
regarding their representations of Indigenous Peoples in the period between 2016 and 2018. My 
aim is to assess how the national printed media represents Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia. My 
methods consist of both qualitative content analysis and frame analysis of media articles, 
published in the online pages of each respective outlet.  
The period analysed coincides with the last term of Bolivia’s first indigenous president, Evo 
Morales. All the articles analysed stem from his last term in office (2014-2019), with all of 
them being from 2016, 2017, and 2018. 
Three of the four newspapers have been selected according to distribution size, whereas the last 
one (Cambio) was chosen purposefully on the basis of being the official state newspaper, 
created by Evo Morales in 2009. The data for the thesis consists of 72 news articles retrieved 
from the online sources of El Deber, La Razón, Página Siete and Cambio. 
La Razón and Página Siete are both based in La Paz, the de facto capital of Bolivia, whereas El 
Deber is centred in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, in the eastern lowlands, the country’s economic 
powerhouse. Cambio, affiliated with the state, also operates from La Paz. 
My goal is to analyse the ways in which these selected media outlets portray Indigenous Peoples 
in Bolivia, by conducting a frame analysis of their online publications regarding Indigenous 
Peoples. I analysed the occurrence of six distinct frames (Conflict, Credibility, (Political) 
Agency, Identity, (De) Colonisation and Responsibility) and their negative or positive 
dimensions, which in turn illustrate which framing is employed when representing Indigenous 
Peoples. 
I also take into account in my analysis how these differ from socially established views on the 
Amerindian (Fabian 1983), as being opposed to the Western, the former representing the past, 
as an apolitical object, and the latter as a symbol of today, a subject of its own modernity, and 
how these align (or not) with the State’s attempt to decolonise Bolivia and guide the discourse 
on indigeneity. Based on anthropological work done in Latin America until the beginning of 
the 1990s, many accounts portrayed the Andean communities as “internally coherent”, in “a 
harmonious totality”, “isolated from the nation-state, development efforts, and wider 
  2 
economy”, and “apart from external influences” (Ranta 2014), contributing to an “essentialized 
construction of Andean communities as relics of the Pre-Columbian past” (Lazar 2008: 9, 
quoted in Ranta 2014: 59); this study looks into whether or not Bolivian media still reproduces 
such a view, much like some other regional media still does (Browne-Sartori et al. 2010), and 
which of the outlets still endorse and convey a similar message. 
Some of the publications portray a new possibility of identity for Indigenous Bolivians (namely 
Cambio), such as political agency (immensely magnified by Morales’ rise to power), the right 
to be educated and to access services in one’s own native language, the legitimacy of indigenous 
justice, or even to assume social and economic posts and positions which have been 
traditionally barred to them and kept in the hands of the non-Indigenous minority, like those 
related to technology, services, education, and, above all, politics and economics, whereas 
others remain steadfast in promoting a mestizo notion of Bolivian identity, diluting historical 
and structural imbalances between parts of the nation. 
Unless otherwise specifically stated, every translation from Spanish to English henceforth is 
my own and of my own personal responsibility if inaccurate. As a non-Bolivian, non-
Indigenous researcher, I accept and fully understand the limitations of my knowledge, be it 
academically acquired or socially embedded, regarding the entirety of the process of 
interpretation and consumption of media publications by the different actors involved in 
Bolivian society, as well as any other shortcomings this limited research might have, be they 
methodological or interpretative. 
2 Historical context and background 
In the words of Herbert Klein, whose “A concise history of Bolivia” has become the standard 
in English for historical recaps of the nation, “Bolivia is, and has been since the sixteenth-
century Spanish conquest, a capitalist Western class-organized society in which the Indians 
were for many centuries an exploited class of workers” (Klein 2011: xii). Like in many other 
countries on the American continent, race in Bolivia is a term that is markedly social. 
Traditionally, there have been three more-or-less well defined strata in Bolivian society; the 
upper, Spanish-speaking, Western-dressed and educated class was understood as the “whites” 
or criollos; the lower and middle classes of the urban sprawls, alongside the European-dressed 
and Spanish-speaking farmers (who sometimes also spoke one of the many native languages) 
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were known as cholos (the term used in Bolivia for what equates to mestizo in other countries 
of the former Hispanic America realms – and not devoid of a pejorative connotation) and the 
Amerindian language-speaking peasants, kept away from power and political activity, “except 
as they abandoned their traditional norms and languages and integrated into the national society 
as cholos or whites” (Klein 2011: xii). 
However, the second half of the twentieth century and especially the new millennium have 
brought many changes to this social framework that had been perpetuated since the colonial 
times. Starting with the National Revolution of 1952, many reforms were undertaken on social, 
economic and political levels, diminishing the gap between the two ends of the social strata 
scope, while at the same time creating a fertile environment for “an alternative means of 
acculturation to modern society without abandoning Amerindian culture and languages” (Klein 
2011: xiii). In the aftermath of these revolutionary changes (which nonetheless had their own 
shortcomings), the Indigenous populations were granted political agency for the first time, 
setting up the next half-century of politics in the country, notwithstanding the near two decades 
of military rule, from 1964 until 1982 (Morales 2004). However, it wasn’t until the end of the 
millennium that the new Indigenous parties and leaders became of great political relevance, on 
a national scale, with what Herbert Klein calls an “emergence of a Mestizo and Indigenous 
Elite”. As an example, the Asamblea por la Soberanía de los Pueblos (Assembly for the 
Sovereignty of Peoples – ASP) was formed in 1995 and, after internal disagreements, the 
Instrumento Político para la Soberanía de los Pueblos (Instrument for the Sovereignty of 
Peoples – IPSP) was founded in 1999 by a group of Morales’ supporters. This group later 
became the Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement for Socialism - MAS) to be able to run in 
national elections (Ranta 2014). Other important civil society groups and organisations, such 
as CONAMAQ (Consejo de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu), were also founded during the late 
1990s (Kohl and Farthing 2006). 
After the 2002 elections and the outrage that stemmed from the way Gonzalo Sánchez de 
Lozada was elected and his support coalition was formed, as well as the outcry that led to the 
so-called Gas Wars (Ranta 2014), the majority of the traditional parties started being displaced 
due to the accumulated anger and exhaustion stemming from the neo-liberal political 
programmes implemented during the two previous decades. PODEMOS (Poder Democrático 
Social – Social Democratic Party, in English), a non-indigenous right-wing party that was, in 
fact, ADN (Acción Democrática Nacionalista – National Democratic Action, in English), the 
party of former dictator Hugo Banzer, emerged, while MAS and Evo Morales, who came up a 
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tight second in the aforementioned contest, had become the most important political entity and 
leader, respectively, in the country. In the 2005 election, MAS and MIP (Movimiento Indígena 
Pachakuti – Pachakuti Indigenous Movement), another significant, though much smaller, 
Indigenous party, won the contest outright, a quick turnaround in comparison to the 2002 
electoral act, building on their 2004 municipal elections breakthrough (Ranta 2014: 21). This 
result left Bolivia’s traditional parties in the wake of both new non-Indigenous organisations 
and emerging Indigenous parties, led by MAS, whose leader, Evo Morales, was elected the first 
self-described Indigenous president of the republic, after garnering more than 50% of the total 
votes (the first president to do so after the military ruling era that ended in 1982), as well as 12 
out of 27 senate seats and 72 out of 130 deputy places. 
After the 2005 election, the country became divided into two larger political areas; on one hand, 
the highland departments of La Paz, Oruro, Cochabamba, Chuquisaca and Potosí, represented 
by the new indigenous class, while on the other the lowland departments of Pando, Beni, Santa 
Cruz and Tarija comprised the traditional elite, though this division was rather fluid, both 
geographically and regarding the intensity of political commitments, with compromises 
between both of the macro-regions achieved without major, strife-creating problems, at least 
initially. The five decades since the National Revolution of 1952 - which for the first time 
granted the right to vote to all adults, irrespective of their literacy levels, at once enfranchising 
masses of campesinos, conducting an agrarian reform, dismantling the hacienda properties of 
the highlands and redistributing them amongst Indigenous workers - have thus seen the republic 
undergo a massive social and economic change, with notable improvements, such as in health 
and in education, alongside the continued existence of some deep-rooted problems, like 
persistent poverty in both rural and urban areas. The access of the whole adult Indigenous 
populace to the right to vote meant that, though decades went by in search of an independent 
political voice, governments had to take into account Indigenous Peoples requests and needs. 
Nonetheless, the country has gone through what some have called the “mestizaje of Bolivian 
society” (Klein 2011: 285), with the economic power that had traditionally been held by the 
white populace being diminished, enabling its popular classes by increasing standards of living 
and improving education, leading to their more significant and independent participation in the 
political scene of the nation. However, this process was not without flaws, as it led in many 
situations to the downplaying of indigeneity and rendered mute many of the claims made by 
Indigenous Peoples, effectively assimilated as mestizos under many public policies. 
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Economically, the continued assimilation of regional economies, spearheaded by the bigger and 
more appealing cities like the neighbouring La Paz and El Alto, had led to the disappearance of 
the rural elites that had been in place since the colonial times and, at the same time, to the 
emergence of a strong mestizo elite with regional influence. From this new elite has emerged a 
vast and powerful group, university-educated professionals and no longer a minority fraction 
contingent to the traditional “white” dominant norms and patterns, able to self-adhere to 
identities such as indigenous, mestizos, Aymara, Quechua, Chiquitano, whilst speaking Spanish 
and/or other native languages, sometimes identifying with seemingly contradictory markers, at 
least in the eyes of the traditional identity-imposing “white” norms. This new mestizo class was, 
alongside various Indigenous groups, the key driving group behind the immense popular 
mobilisations (though massive public demonstrations were not, by any means, a new 
phenomenon in Bolivia) that demanded change between the election in 2002 and the rise to 
power of Evo Morales in the electoral act of December 2005, punctuated by the aforementioned 
and infamous Water (1999-2000) and Gas (2003) Wars and the resignation of President 
Sánchez Lozada later that same year. Morales’ program saw a major injection of mestizo and 
especially Indigenous political leaders into governmental positions, which was not surprising 
to any of his political adversaries, but most importantly, at least economically, was the decision 
to abandon the long-standing tradition of privatisations within the country. Attempting a 
different approach to guide the national economy,  
“the Morales government has renationalized gas and oil production, taken over all 
telecommunications, all the electricity companies, even from national cooperatives, proposed the 
elimination of private pension plans, re-created a state airlines company, nationalized two Swiss 
smelters, and systematically pushed for state control over mineral resources from iron ore to lithium” 
(Klein 2011: 288). 
Morales’ government added amendments to the Agrarian Reform of 1953, especially regarding 
the lowland estate distribution, untouched by it. Building on the 2002 land reform act, Morales 
redistributed more than 30 million hectares to more than 150000 farmers and peasants, many 
of which Indigenous Peoples that had lost their lands to the big properties illegally and corruptly 
distributed during the military regimes (Klein 2011: 290). 
Politically, Morales also signified a stark contrast to previous Bolivian presidents and 
governments. On the international politics side, the MAS government has moved away from 
the United States, sometimes even overtly and aggressively, instead focusing on independently 
building relationships with Indigenous groups, from Northern Europe to Central America, 
  6 
advocating environmental protection at the international level (while having to deal with its 
implications nationally1) and bringing Bolivia to the global diplomatic spotlight via its own 
steps. Adding to its long list of dramatic changes, Morales’ government pushed intensely for a 
new constitutional framework, aiming to expand decentralisation and the plurinational aspect 
of the state, which were the key themes of the MAS party, both before and during the campaign 
for the 2005 election. Setting the tone for MAS’s political project, the 2009 Constitution 
represented “the culmination of a long process (…) to shape the postcolonial terms of political 
participations, which has been historically defined by the profound marginalization of its 
indigenous and popular majority” (Albro 2010: 71), guaranteeing the rights of the Indigenous 
communities to their forms of government, while bolstering autonomy at the departmental, 
regional, communal and municipal levels, furthering decentralisation. The document called for 
the acknowledgment of Indigenous persons as “full citizens”, recognising not only the highland 
Indigenous groups but also the lowland ones and even the comparatively small Afro-Bolivian 
community. By declaring Bolivia a plurinational state whose status was reflected legally, the 
new constitution established 37 different Indigenous languages as official alongside Spanish, 
inculcated the autonomy of its regions and its self-governing bodies, created legal frameworks 
instilling respect for different individuals, communities, codes of etiquettes and belief systems, 
reaffirming the interculturality of its social fabric by renaming itself thenceforth Estado 
Plurinacional de Bolivia. Perhaps most importantly to the topic, it also stated that the state itself 
was responsible for guaranteeing the communal land rights of the Indigenous communities, 
their traditional worldviews, medicine practices, rituals, symbols and even their traditional 
garments, while at the same time enabling Indigenous groups to “exercise their own unique 
political, judicial, and economic systems as defined by their own cosmology” (Klein 2011: 
292). Furthermore, it even contained provisions for Indigenous communities known as pueblos 
originarios to “declare themselves self-governing entities independent of municipal or 
departmental governments with self-governing rights that were equal to those granted to these 
institutions” (ibid: 292), while at the same time acquiesced to demands from isolated groups 
wishing to remain so. 
Notwithstanding the tremendous work done at the domestic level, the political project of the 
Movimiento al Socialismo was fortunate to have impeccable timing. Morales’ ascent to power 
was coupled with support from sympathetic regional governments in South America, such as 
 
1 Lalander, Rickard. 2017. Ethnic rights and the dilemma of extractive development in plurinational Bolivia. The 
International Journal of Human Rights 21 (4): 464-481 is a good starting point. 
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those in Brazil, Venezuela and Ecuador, amongst others of the so called “pink tide” that reached 
its peak during Evo’s second term in office. At the same time, US interventions in Latin 
America had dwindled down due to their investment in Middle Eastern affairs, and steady 
international demand for hydrocarbons kept government revenues high and constant. 
Nonetheless, there have been some less than desirable consequences relating to this immense 
shift in the Bolivian socio-political landscape; constant national political tension, an 
intermittent lack of willingness to dialogue and negotiate with the opposition and occasional 
undermining of adversary political figures have shown hints of a certain authoritarianism by 
MAS, most recently illustrated by the decision to ignore the referendum of February 2018, 
which negated by popular vote the right to stand for indefinite re-election. 
The remarkable and intense change that has happened during the last two decades has set the 
stage for the MAS’ attempt to decolonise the state, in ways that go far beyond the economic 
and political stage. Many seem to think that “the new plurinational state is the culmination of 
centuries of struggle over the status of Bolivia’s native peoples” (Postero 2013: 107), with 
indigeneity as a central concept for re-imagining the nation and Indigenous persons as the 
archetypical citizen of a new country. 
3 Media in Bolivia 
Media throughout Latin America is typically characterised by a “high level of market 
concentration, resulting in the representation of a narrow set of perspectives” (Lupien 2013 
:226), with social and political movements built around defying the supremacy of social elites 
often described as “dangerous and reckless” (ibid.). In the case of Bolivia, media is highly 
concentrated, with both television networks and newspaper outlets being controlled and owned 
by a handful of actors, with long-term associations to the more established and long-standing 
political parties. While this is particularly true when it comes to television (ATB, Bolivisión, 
Red Uno, Unitel and PAT have more than two-thirds of market share), it is equally notable 
regarding the print media. El Deber, La Razón, La Prensa, and El Diario take home slightly 
less than two-thirds of the national circulation. Although La Prensa and El Diario are not part 
of this analysis, their inclusion in future studies could be of relevance, given their importance 
in the national media landscape. In a sense, media ownership in Bolivia “resembles that of the 
rest of the economic sectors”, as there are “very close ties between the business elites and the 
traditional political system” (Quintanilla 2014: 182), with sometimes not-so-vested interests 
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seeping through the media content brought to the public. El Deber is owned by the Rivero 
family (which also has ties to La Prensa), historically connected to Bolivia’s three traditional 
parties (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario - MNR, Acción Democrática Nacionalista – 
ADN, and Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria - MIR), while La Razón is owned by the 
Grupo PRISA, a Spanish media conglomerate which also owns El País, Spain’s second most 
circulated daily newspaper. El País has historical ties with the PSOE, the Spanish Socialist 
Party, and is often described politically as a centrist newspaper, with a certain leaning towards 
the left side of the political spectrum. 
More so than the market shares garnered by each of the media outlets, the relationship between 
them and the current government is of the utmost significance. Nowadays, the political situation 
in Bolivia is so polarised that “the media are considered not just as an adversary but as an (sic) 
straightforward enemy” of the government (Quintanilla 2014: 178). To understand why this is 
so, a look back to the historical context on Bolivian democracy, media ownership structure and 
the state media relations before Evo Morales’ administration sheds some light. The three 
aforementioned parties (MNR, AND, MIR) had since the 1960s perpetuated “a lack of 
representation and engendered corruption”, and with constant pandering to “corporate interests, 
and even those personal and small group interests”, in turn favouring “patrimonial, privileged, 
nepotistic and clientelist practices” (Villanueva 2007, as cited in Quintanilla 2014: 178), where 
at the same time there was a certain media empowerment. At first, the media became “spaces 
of political display”, as it “brought the facts and actors of politics to the citizens regularly, not 
only during electoral periods” (Quintanilla 2014: 180). Secondly, the media became more and 
more participative in political activity, “intervening explicitly in orienting public decisions, in 
conflict management and in promoting or disqualifying actors” (Villanueva, as cited in 
Quintanilla 2014: 180). Lastly, the media assumed “not only a watchdog role over politics, but 
in fact an active role determined by direct continuous exchange with politicians and policy-
makers”, becoming a key player in national politics (ibid). As an example, Boas cites the news 
coverage of Evo Morales’ second election campaign in 2009, which was “overwhelmingly 
biased against him”, as “only 1% of his coverage was positive, and only 2% of that devoted to 
his major opponent, Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga, was negative” (Boas 2012: 26). In a sense, and as 
Quintanilla puts it, 
“(…) media and Bolivian journalists see themselves as a Fourth Power. For most journalists it is 
unthinkable to refrain from giving their own opinions and stick only to reporting on the debate among the 
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political and social actors. One of the consequences of these practices, according to the author [Peñaranda], 
has been the substitution of informational genres for journalists’ opinions. (Quintanilla 2014: 183) 
This situation of the media being seen as “a ‘political battlefield’ where journalists and social 
movements are the new actors” (Quintanilla 2014: 180) is something which has arisen only 
since the beginning of the new millennium. According to Quintanilla (2014) and Sáinz (2010), 
it was only after the Indigenous conflicts in the early 2000s “that the big media networks began 
to include the stories of these social movements in their news agendas” (Quintanilla 2014: 180), 
up until now almost completely neglected and unreported. Due to its central role in Bolivian 
politics, an unprepared media “lacked any true capacity of anticipation, preparation, and 
commitment to democracy and ended up acting at times reactively and, in other cases, with 
sensationalism” (Quintanilla 2014: 181), contributing to the polarised and explosive media 
context of Bolivia today. 
This schism, however, was not only caused by a self-entitled media; Evo Morales did his best 
to challenge the status quo and with it brought on a “quick polarization between the new 
government, supported by social and indigenous movements, and middle and upper classes that 
had benefited from the existing establishment” (Quintanilla 2014: 181). This led to the 
aforementioned regional divide in the country, as most of these middle and upper classes were 
and are concentrated in the so-called Media Luna, the eastern, lowland departments which 
constitute the industrial and economic powerhouse of Bolivia, with Santa Cruz leading the way. 
This divide created an idea that the claims made by Morales’ government were a “popular 
insurrection” and that “indigenous groups’ uprising in search for a historical vindication against 
traditional political and economic elites” were the reason behind them (Quintanilla 2014: 181-
182), delegitimising both Evo’s political agenda and grassroots and Indigenous movements. 
Morales and his government clashed with the media from the outset, as Evo viewed most of the 
media as trying “to protect the interests of groups linked to traditional political parties” 
(Quintanilla 2014: 185). This polarity is, according to Quintanilla, “rooted in unsolved ethnic, 
regional, and class divisions in Bolivia” (ibid: 186). By bringing ethnicity and class to the clash, 
Morales made “private media appear as vehicles of racist groups who yearn for past 
domination” (ibid: 192), a criticism perhaps not totally unwarranted. This clash between the 
media and Morales stems from the way in which the latter has “reconfigured the media scenario 
by creating or strengthening a network of state-funded media, defined by a clear promotional 
and propagandist editorial line”, which the executive justifies by claiming that “private media 
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are negatively biased against the government” (Quintanilla 2014: 190). The creation of Cambio, 
one of the newspapers analysed in this thesis, is an example of this attempt by the State to 
publish its own discourse and level the playing field. 
In sum, Quintanilla labels the Bolivian media as a “a captured liberal system”, though “more 
extreme than other cases in the region”, with the interaction between politics and the media 
“defined by the constant interference of political and economic interests on the watchdog role 
of the media” (Quintanilla 2014: 186). On the governmental side, there has been an effort to 
align media with the new political conjuncture more so than to dismantle private media per se. 
This, however, has turned most commercial media into “partisan supporters of the opposition, 
and populist presidents have abandoned any public service pretensions with state media, 
dragging them into the fray as well” (Boas 2012: 29-30), of which Cambio’s coverage is a clear 
example. 
Some newspapers have let their political affiliations and stances clear through their 
publications. El Deber, for example, has used “frames and labels that portray “ethnic” peoples 
(generally identified as Morales supporters) as irrational and unreasonable for demanding 
special “cultural rights” over “equality before the law”, as well as falsely associating 
“indigenous or community justice with lynchings and barbaric practices” (Lupien 2013: 236-
237). La Razón has followed similar tactics, claiming Indigenous justice would lead to “social 
chaos and the destruction of the state”, and that Evo Morales’ government “was planning to 
apply indigenous justice to nonindigenous people or extend these practices to the major cities” 
and “against citizens” (Lupien 2013: 237), claims which were not only unsubstantiated but also 
against the stipulations of the plurinational constitution. In all, the media portrayal of those 
supportive of the Morales government, which, inevitably, includes vast scores of Indigenous 
Peoples, has been less than unbiased and impartial, but neither has the content produced by the 
State, which casts its own inflammatory doubts over the opposition along ethnic and racial lines 
for its own political purposes. 
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4 Previous Research on Representations, Othering, 
and Representation of Indigenous Peoples in 
Bolivia 
4.1 Representations 
Representation is by excellence the field within which much of the colonialist and post-colonial 
interactions occur, as well as a major driving force behind the establishing of a colonial 
paradigm, perhaps to the point of being comparable, in its reaches and effect, to the conquests 
in themselves (Ashcroft et al. 2003). The role of writers, novelists, anthropologists, historians 
and the rest of the text-producing agents of the colonising powers was one based on framing 
the “Other” into “European frameworks which read his or her alterity as terror or lack” (ibid: 
85). Not only were these ideas of a starkly different and inferior “Other” spread amongst the 
psyche of those back at the metropoles but they too were projected on those colonised “Others”, 
perpetuated via media, literature, education and the socio-cultural norms of the colonialist 
society, therefore establishing the acceptable boundaries of what the colonised could 
understand as their own image, enduring even after independence. 
As a perfect example of identity building via the process of Othering, these texts acted as 
representations of the colonial subject that posited the coloniser as the norm and the standard, 
as a superior one, based not on any “accounts of different peoples and societies, but a projection 
of European fears and desires masquerading as scientific/‘objective’ knowledges” (Ashcroft et 
al. 2003: 85). Said’s work (1989) is perhaps one of the bases for the postcolonial understanding 
of representation, and it is of importance when considering the identity creation of criollos in 
Bolivia. It is by using, controlling and producing the methods of spreading and disseminating 
information that the colonial representations still endure long after the de jure colonising has 
ended, where it has indeed ended. 
4.2 Othering 
The concept of Othering is one that goes hand in hand with identity, both historically and as 
co-creators of complementary meanings. Stemming from the heart of post-colonial theory, the 
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concept of Othering tries to explain how identities are located “within specific social contexts 
and conditioned by them” (Jensen 2011: 63). Spivak introduces the concept and illustrates the 
ways in which the self composes its own identity in opposition to the Other, how this process 
is “producing an “other” text – the true history” (Spivak 1985: 257), rendering all others as 
marginal and, therefore, illegitimate. Hall takes it a step further and theorises that “the notion 
that identity has to do with people that look the same, feel the same, call themselves the same, 
is nonsense”, for identity, “as a process, as a narrative, as a discourse, it is always from the 
position of the Other” (Hall 1991: 49). The process of identity-making is then understood as 
one fundamentally attached to representing and perceiving the self as opposed to some Other. 
Howarth posits that “identities are continually developed and contested through others’ 
representations of our claimed social groups” (Howarth 2002: 159) and Dervin understands 
Othering as a form of social representation, of objectifying a person, thus putting aside and 
ignoring “the complexity and subjectivity of the individual” (Dervin 2012: 187), essentialising 
and enacting “Othering by imposing cultural elements as explanations for people’s behaviours, 
encounters, opinions” (ibid), with the end result of protecting and reinforcing the Self in 
contrast with the Other, something that Dervin, like Hall, understands as impossible not to do. 
In relation to colonial and postcolonial studies in particularly, Othering describes “the various 
ways in which colonial discourse produces its subjects”, a “dialectical process because the 
colonizing Other is established at the same time as its colonized others are produced as 
subjects” (Ashcroft et al 2007: 156). The process lumps together people “into a collective 
‘they’” (Pratt 1985: 139), confirming the reality of those that are in a position of power by 
“delineating that opposition that must exist” so that the “empire can define itself against those 
it colonizes, excludes and marginalizes”, positioning” its ‘others’ by this process in the pursuit 
of that power within which its own subjectivity is established (Ashcroft et al. 2007: 158), in a 
co-creating process of identity affecting both sides. 
4.3 Representation of Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia 
While there is almost no previous research regarding representation of Indigenous Peoples in 
national newspapers specifically, there is plenty of research on how they have been portrayed 
at large, whether politically (and by the State) or socially. Indigenous groups in Bolivia have 
been represented since the colonial times under many different lights, most of them not so 
endearing, be it in public discourse, governmental agendas and in socially acceptable habits, 
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practices and normalised abusive settings. Some terms and images have persisted throughout 
time, such as chola and cholo (the former meaning, somewhat positively, a mestizo woman who 
is “hard-working, humble, gentle, passionate and willing to sacrifice” (Droguett 2013: 383), 
with the latter being an equivalent to the usage of indio, a derogatory term to refer to an 
Indigenous male), still very much in use in La Paz and the altiplano. Throughout the centuries, 
there has been what Field calls a “considerable mutual internalization of the cultural 
characteristics” of both Hispanic and Indigenous Bolivians, leading to Indigenous Peoples using 
“the very institutions and doctrines that the colonizers imposed to erase the past and destroy 
resistance” to survive and resist, so much so that “modern day ‘indigenous ethnic groups’ and 
‘indigenous cosmologies’ are unintelligible apart from their struggle with the state” (Field 1994: 
244-245). 
Another key actor in the representation of Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia is the State itself and 
it has been so throughout the centuries. As the terms indígena and mestizo are “a sociopolitical 
decision, the result of sociopolitical practice” (Ströbele-Gregor et al. 1994: 107), the role of the 
State in shaping discourse is decisive; if on one hand, “a white Bolivian would attempt to ward 
off discrimination claims by claiming that “we Bolivians are all mestizos””, Indigenous people 
would employ “the same term in order to prevent said discrimination from taking place” (ibid: 
107)2. The first State to (politically) enfranchise Indigenous Peoples was the one established 
after the 1952 National Revolution, though its stance regarding Indigenous Peoples followed 
an equally damaging pattern to those enacted before; the State “grew around the notion of a 
glorified creole-mestizo class”, turning it into “substance of the nation” (Ströbele-Gregor et al. 
1994:107), thereby disarming Indigenous Peoples’ specific needs and demands. As previously 
alluded to, Indigenous peoples were rebranded campesinos (peasants, in Spanish) and, as 
Ströbele-Gregor puts it, “a criollo elite, self-imagined as white (in the socio-political sense), 
perpetuated its own benefits and privileges, culturally, politically, economically and socially, 
while at the same time undertaking the “burden” of “assimilating the Indians, eliminating their 
autonomous cultures and living patterns” (Ströbele-Gregor et al. 1994: 108), implementing the 
 
2  Xavier Albó states that “in Bolivia both terms [campesino and indígena] are equally applicable in the countryside 
– the overwhelming majority of the rural population is indigenous, in terms of its identity and ethnic and cultural 
origins, and at the same time campesino, because of its means of subsistence or social class. In addition, following 
the 1952 Revolution both public and popular discourses were permeated by a pseudo-modernising tendency which 
restricted the use of the term ‘indigenous’ to describe only the most isolated groups, in particular ethnic minorities 
in the lowlands. The rest of the indigenous population was referred to only as ‘campesino’. However, with the 
resurgence of ethnic pluralism and legislation more favourable to indigenous people throughout the world, this 
trend is currently in decline.” (Albó, Xavier. 2002. “Bolivia: From Indian and Campesino Leaders to Councillors 
and Parliamentary Deputies.” In Multiculturalism in Latin America: Indigenous rights, diversity, and democracy, 
edited by Rachel Sieder, 74-102. New York: Palgrave Macmillan). 
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Western-inspired ideas of civilisation, progress and modernisation, requiring they “renounce” 
their “Indianness”. 
By the late 1970s, though, the ideological tenets of the 1952 revolution were wearing thin 
(hindered immensely by the devastating acts and consequences of the dictatorial regimes from 
the post 1964 era, some, namely that of Hugo Banzer, politically supported by the MNR) and 
the emergence of “ethnic discourses and autonomous movements” (Ströbele-Gregor et al. 1994: 
109) became a reality in the second half of the 1980s. However, the Indian peasant movements 
and the Indianist (mostly urban) organisations did not share, at the beginning of the 1990s, an 
ideological core; instead, these movements were linked by “an ethnic interpretation of social 
reality in which the dominant criollos are defined as whites but with widely varying self-
definitions” (Ströbele-Gregor et al. 1994:113-114), which made unified political relevancy and 
action considerably more difficult. One particularly stark difference is the way in which 
different Indigenous Peoples have dealt and coexisted historically with the criollo society (and 
between themselves); highland Aymara and Quechua-speaking Peoples have developed “a 
historical consciousness”, a “reawakened pride in their cultural origin”, which create an 
“idealization of Andean culture and ethnocentrism”, rejected by lowland Indigenous Peoples, 
seen by highlanders, in a cruelly ironic way,  as “less civilized and backward” (Ströbele-Gregor 
et al. 1994: 114), and mattering very little in the public and political discourses and spheres. 
This has been pointed out by many authors in regards to public policies and especially in 
relation to the 2009 constitution, both of which have been criticised as being Aymara or 
highland-centric. 
Other authors, like José Lucero, have similarly expounded how Indigenous Peoples in Latin 
America have been portrayed and how their “realness” as “Indians” has been represented and 
questioned. Since the Western-imposed view of the Native American is one of purity, different 
groups of Indigenous Peoples are often “Othered” under a different light, i.e., given authority 
by Westerners. On the one hand, Indigenous Peoples from the Andes are seen as “less “pure” 
and “authentic” than their Amazonian counterparts” (Lucero 2006: 35), for they have engaged 
in attempts to dismantle and re-appropriate Western languages and strategies, having thus 
become “westernised”. Since the Westerner perception of Indigenous Peoples already has a 
model deeply enrooted in racist and colonial ideas which don’t accommodate agency and are 
frozen in time, this “confines native people to limited cultural and political worlds whose 
boundaries are set by outside observers” (ibid: 35). In many ways, this happens not only socially 
but also politically; the “official notions of what constitutes Bolivian national heritage has a 
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Eurocentric bias” and it “stems from racialised notions of cultural heritage inherited from the 
colonial period” (Oviedo 2014: 59). This notion leads to an essentialised idea of Bolivian, and 
therefore Indigenous, identity as one of mestizaje, which the 1952 revolution exacerbated. This 
alleged move towards “hybridity” involves not an evenly matched syncretism but rather 
presupposes, and requires, “distancing oneself from the Indian social condition and thus de-
Indianising” (de la Cadena 2000: 316, quoted in Oviedo 2014: 65). Oviedo uses the Carnival 
of Oruro as an example to illustrate how “sanitised, non-subversive and simplified images of 
the indio permitido” (a mestizaje–embracing one) survive today, without the need (or will) to 
“convey the legacy of discrimination, theft and extermination suffered by indigenous peoples” 
(Oviedo 2014: 65-66), diluted in this construct of indigeneity. Much in the same way, Bolivian 
printed media, with the exception of Cambio, controlled by Evo Morales’ government, 
perpetuates a similar idea. 
In sum, the State as an agent of representation of Indigenous Peoples has moved from casting 
them as backwards and un-developed in the pre-1952 National Revolution era, to trying to 
dilute their identity and agency under the guise of mestizaje after 1952, to almost completely 
monopolising the discourse on indigeneity and Indigenous Peoples through a highlands-
inspired perspective in the Evo Morales era. Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia have historically 
been marginally kept aside since the state’s foundation as an independent nation; its official 
history presents a country “constituted only by whites” (Gruner 2003: 182). However, it was 
not only the State that preserved such a stance, with the media having played its own part in 
perpetuating discrimination and negative stereotypes, acting as the State’s mouthpiece in its 
systemic erasing of Indigenous Peoples from nationhood. It is important, however, to 
distinguish between the different types of media and their reach and impact on the public 
discourse; radio is by far the most widely available and far-reaching media in Bolivia, as well 
as the one with the broadest history, especially in regards to Indigenous media, whereas 
television (and other visual means of representation) has steadily gained space in the public 
Bolivian eye only in the last few decades. Printed media, on the other hand, is still a distant 
third when it comes to current ubiquity and importance in the national landscape. It was chosen, 
though, as it is a rapidly growing media, with eight major newspapers having been founded 
since 2006, including two of the four publications analysed for this thesis in the state-owned 
Cambio and the increasingly important Página Siete. 
In regards to printed media and its historical part, its role in deciding who was included and 
excluded in the newly independent Bolivia was evident; the press held the same ideological 
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beliefs behind the Criollo national project being implemented, contrasting “barbarian” 
languages, dialects and peoples with the “Enlightenment” path chosen by an elitist nation-state 
(Unzueta 2000: 42). The patent heterogeneity of the Bolivian ethnic, linguistic and cultural 
fabric was portrayed as an obstacle to the “progress” of the nation, whereas acting towards 
diluting differences and homogenising the country was lauded and indorsed, reflecting an 
assimilationist tendency which promoted a notion of bringing civilisation to the “barbarian” 
Indians (Unzueta 2000: 44). Consequently, Indigenous Peoples were cast as being second-
degree parts of the nation, socially and legally below the Europeanised idea of Bolivian 
nationhood and its members, “denying or marginalising their possible contribution to the 
cultural programs of the fatherland” (Unzueta 2000: 45). The printed media served from the 
foundation of the country as the only medium guiding public opinion, with a dearth of book 
publishers or higher education centres, resulting in a vacuum of other counter-acting voices and 
setting an ominous tone for the many decades to follow.3 
These formative years were quite important in setting the stage for the subdued and repressed 
status of Indigenous Peoples in the country (adding to the effect many centuries of colonial rule 
already had had), having through endless propaganda and silent, deliberate negligence of their 
plight achieved a “humbled abasement” (Montenegro 2016: 235) from the popular classes. This 
representation (or lack thereof) was so heavily slanted during the first few decades of the 
Bolivian Republic that the first positive mentions of Indigenous Peoples’ predicament only 
appears during the presidency of Manuel Isidoro Belzu, between the years of 1848 and 1855 
(ibid). Those drafting and writing the texts published by the first newspapers were often times 
men of the highest political strata, with many of them having served in high-ranking political 
roles, namely the presidency of the nation (Unzueta 2000), a situation which has not changed 
completely.4 
 
3As an example, Indigenous Peoples have been blamed for the lack of economic developed of Bolivia since the 
post-independence era of the first half of the nineteenth century, and their rejection of certain agricultural reforms 
was deemed “precivilised, ignorant and barbaric”, stigmas which remained assigned along ethnic lines (Irurozqui 
2008: 88) 
4 Carlos Mesa, for example, who served as President of Bolivia from 2003 to 2005, after the resignation of Gonzalo 
Sánchez de Lozada, under whom he had served as Vice-President, was the author of some of the articles analysed 
for this thesis. 
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Throughout its turbulent history, though, the representation of Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia 
has undergone profound changes, greatly owing to Indigenous resistance and pushback in the 
fight for the right and access to means of self-representation, especially after the 1940s and 
1950s.5 Starting from the 1952 revolution, Indigenous groups started converging and organising 
to this effect, gravitating around the idea of re-appropriating cultural representations as 
elements of political resistance. As previously mentioned, the radio was the preferred medium 
to propagate their message due to its low-cost maintenance, easy usage, and far-reaching waves, 
capable of spreading beyond other means, and accessible to most of the population. 
Even though the miner-run radios (since the ‘40s and ‘50s) and the mostly catechism-spreading 
Christian broadcasters (in the ‘60s) had already been hitting the waves for decades, these means 
of alternative and communitarian communication (and representation) only started to be 
employed by Indigenous and campesino groups from the ‘70s and ‘80s onwards (Martín 2018). 
Radioemisora Bolivia, as an example, was founded in Oruro in 1971, kickstarting the nation’s 
Indigenous communication movement (Martín 2018: 24), though still not completely run and 
managed by Indigenous Peoples. Although some other radio stations already started 
broadcasting in Quechua and Aymara in the 1960s (Ros Izquierdo 2004), it would be almost 
two decades before the first “totally Indigenous” (Martín 2018: 25) radio was founded, with 
Radio Mallku Kirkiya being established in Potosí, in 1990, broadcasting during the weekends. 
In the meantime, the spread of communitarian Indigenous and campesino radios ever since the 
establishing of  Radioemisora Bolivia led to the creation of regional and national associations, 
like the Asociación de Radios Indígenas Aymaras en La Paz, in 1988, the Red Amazónica 
(covering the Chaco and the Amazon areas), in 1994, and the national-level Asociación 
Provincial de Radios Comunitarias de Bolivia, established in 1996. These conglomerates of 
locally-run radio broadcasters established a network of communication between different 
Indigenous groups and Peoples, creating awareness in regards to the power of communication 
and media in strengthening identities and serving as a means of political resistance (Martín 
2018: 27). 
 
5 It is always important to highlight the disparity existing between different Indigenous groups; whereas some have 
had greater success in the struggle to find and cast their own voice, like the Aymara and, to a lesser extent, the 
Quechua, some others, like the Guaraní and many of the less numerically significant Indigenous groups, especially 
from the lowlands, still haven’t managed to break through (see Ros Izquierdo 2004). 
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At the same time, especially during the late ‘80s and throughout the ‘90s, this movement 
kickstarted by communitarian radios led to breakthroughs in the audio-visual field of self-
representation, following a nation-wide trend that even permeated national television. The 
Coordinadora Audiovisual Indígena de Bolivia was formed in 1996, following a structure and 
model resembling the ayllu and the “logic of communal life of the Indigenous Peoples of 
Bolivia” (Martín 2018: 32), with the Sistema Plurinacional de Comunicación (previously 
named Sistema Nacional de Comunicación Indígena Originario Campesino Intercultural) 
being founded in the same year. These organisations, both regionally and nationally, have 
brought and still bring forth the interests and perspectives of the many Indigenous groups and 
Peoples of Bolivia, highlighting their role (or desired role) in the national scene and political 
landscape, creating not only a way to reach the mainstream strata of media in the country but 
also a medium to increase communication between all levels of Bolivian society, especially 
between Indigenous Peoples, intercultural, and Afro-Bolivian communities. 
Meanwhile, a parallel movement was emerging in the greater realm of cinema, with Indigenous 
Peoples fighting back to regain their own iconography, to stop and curb “the justification of 
integration, impoverishing and homogenisation policies imposed on [Indigenous] Peoples and 
the diversity of their identities” (Rodríguez 2007: 107). The Carta Abierta de Cochabamba, in 
1996, was a formal starting point in combating ossified and frozen representations of 
Indigenous Peoples in cinema, both in Latin America and outside of it, which still are the norm 
in many mainstream cinematic productions. In Bolivia in particular, the work of Jorge Sanjinés 
stands out, with the director’s Ukamau (1966) and La Nación Clandestina (1989) being some 
of the most relevant national works exploring the invisible and second-grade role of Indigenous 
groups and Peoples in Bolivia’s nationhood. It was also under Sanjinés’ guidance that the 
Grupo Ukamau was founded in 1960, creating a solid foundation for the creation of films and 
movies aiming to portray the realities and lives of the marginalised Indigenous Peoples of 
Bolivia, giving self-representation a central role in the process of decolonisation (Rodríguez 
2007). 
On the television medium, the story of Indigenous Peoples’ representation in Bolivia had also 
been one of slow progresses and episodic successes until the last few decades. The most notable 
example of an Indigenous-friendly television setting was that established by Carlos Palenque, 
in 1980. Palenque established Radio Metropolitana at first, creating the radio station in 1980 
and its landmark program Tribuna Libre del Pueblo shortly thereafter, before acquiring the 
rights to Canal 4 in 1985 and bringing the show to television. This program “invited participants 
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from the Aymara communities of La Paz and El Alto (…) [to] talk candidly about their daily 
needs and problems”, making it a “milestone in the history of indigenous representation in 
Bolivian private media” (Garcia 2018: 94), up until then overtly and biasedly negative towards 
Indigenous Peoples, used and employed at will to serve their own political and economic 
agendas. It created a platform for Indigenous Peoples to discuss their problems and air their 
grievances, with personal testimonies and first-hand accounts (Himpele 2002). By doing so, 
Palenque “instilled a sense of social, class, and political consciousness among the local 
indigenous population” (Garcia 2018: 97) and created a new political space for paceño Aymara. 
Before the emergence of the current state-run media under Evo Morales, Palenque’s show and 
his political party, CONDEPA, were the first and almost only highly visible medium that was 
truly indigenous-friendly, in sharp contrast with the rest of the private television landscape of 
the country, almost exclusively owned by Santa Cruz-based outlets. 
In sum, the representations of Indigenous People in Bolivia have until recently been mostly 
negative and overtly partial, in part due to the lack of access and ownership of media-producing 
means by Indigenous Peoples, unable to create their own discourse and representation 
themselves. There has been a steady increase in awareness regarding the role, needs and rights 
of Indigenous Peoples and their represented image in the media, owing to a more favourable 
political climate (starting, somewhat perniciously, with the 1952 Revolution and peaking with 
Evo Morales’ rise to power), better and more access to means of producing media by 
Indigenous Peoples and their organisations and a general trend towards bringing the Indigenous 
slice of Bolivia into the national fore, with true political enfranchisement leading this wave.  
Even though there is a generally more pro-Indigenous stance in big outlets of the printed media 
in Bolivia (though only in some), there is still a glaring shortage of Indigenous-held and led 
media which matches the number, relevance and weight of Indigenous Bolivians, both in 
number of publications, circulation, and recognition. However, even when media is produced 
by Indigenous Peoples, the representations conveyed are still heavily influenced both by 
Bolivia’s past history and the (Western) dynamics and logics of media circulation and 
consumption. In a sense, they are also structured “by the expectations and meanings that 
indigenous and non-indigenous audiences invest in these images” (Villarreal 2014: 78). There 
is still a shortage of what Himpele calls “new representations”, which “validate and perform 
indigenous ways of knowing” (Himpele 2004: 356), long subdued under the official mestizo 
history. To Gabriela Villarreal, Indigenous media makers are “constantly caught between 
portraying realistic, though problematic and contradictory, aspects of life in their communities 
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and employing a visual repertoire characterised by what some anthropologists have termed 
‘Indigenism’ or an ‘American Orientalism’” (Villarreal 2014: 82), in a seemingly paradoxical 
attempt to subvert, yet doing so in a not-so-blatant, overt manner. In a sense, they “fight against 
– while sometimes unintentionally reproducing – the imagery and practices of display that 
commodify, exoticise or spectacularise indigeneity” (ibid: 91). It is in this precariously 
negotiated position that Indigenous and pro-Indigenous image and media makers locate 
themselves, with a constant back-and-forth between politicising indigeneity, as Morales did 
(which Cambio clearly reflects), yet attempting to stop short of essentializing Indigenous 
Peoples and turning them into totemic representations. 
5 Theoretical Concepts 
5.1 Decolonisation 
Decolonisation can be conventionally understood as the end of “the political control, physical 
occupation, and domination of people over another people and their land for purposes of 
extraction and settlement to benefit the occupiers” (Crawford 2002: 131; quoted in Ranta 2014: 
56). The remnants of a subservient past are still to be seen in the very fabric of society, though, 
at levels of “unequal class relations and racial discrimination against indigenous peoples and 
other ethnic minority groups” (Ranta 2014: 56). In a sense, the rearranged Latin American 
geographies have been built under the same theoretical framework, with a “basis of knowledge 
and epistemologies of European origin, thereby producing and reproducing hierarchical 
colonial relations with Latin American societies” (ibid: 55), stifling effective and 
epistemological independencies. 
As presented by Ranta (2014), two main challenges face attempts to decolonise, tightly knit 
together; on one hand, the fabric of the global economic ties (and its neoliberal engine), and on 
the other hand the ever-forward ploughing of what she calls the “modern project”. This process 
(to decolonise) lays its foundations on the hope of “constructing alternative knowledge and 
epistemologies” (Ranta 2014: 57), distinguishing itself from the postcolonial line of thought 
that has emerged outside of Latin America, strengthening its argument by claiming that Western 
postcolonial ideas don’t contextualise Latin American idiosyncrasies, representing another 
forced intellectual imposition from the old spheres and locales of power. Although the Bolivian 
State has remained adamant in its pursuit of decolonisation, the definition it provides for it as 
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well as the means through which it intends to achieve it have remained, perhaps for political 
reasons, ever so ambiguous and vague, losing vigour with time. At the same time, many 
different intellectuals, both Bolivian and foreign, Indigenous and not, have provided their own 
understandings of the concept in general and applied to the Bolivian context in particular. The 
State has taken on a patron-like role in promoting certain definitions of the term, though it has 
not monopolised the discussions entirely, even in certain publications from its own ministries. 
The Bolivian sociologist Patricia Chávez posits decolonisation through the lens of 
interculturality and highlights two basic schools of thought amongst Bolivia’s political and 
intellectual strata; on the one hand, there is a radical alternative which endorses the 
“construction of a social coexistence not necessarily mediated by the existence or the 
reinforcement of the state” (Chávez 2011: 16), while on the other hand some are proponents of 
tackling decolonisation from within the State and its institutional features, albeit from a critical 
viewpoint and opposing some of its divisive and unjust traits, such as monoculturalism (Chávez 
2011). How then, can decolonisation be seen from an interculturality point of view? Chávez 
argues that interculturality is a critique of the ingrained conception of a culture as superior to 
another, presenting itself as an idealised version or goal for other cultures to aim towards and 
to achieve. In this sense, interculturality can be a tool of decolonisation, accepting diversity and 
a pluriversity of ideas and paradigms, drawing on Walter Mignolo’s concept of the de-colonial 
paradigm, not as one replacing others but as one “affirming pluriversality as a universal project” 
(Mignolo 2006, quoted in Chávez 2011: 28). For her, then, “decolonising in intercultural terms 
would imply considering that there is no longer a centre which positions itself as the measuring 
stick to other cultures” (Chávez 2011: 29-30). 
She argues that  
“using indigenous mythology and a discourse of recovering its culture to create a timeless image of 
itself would be another way of reproducing a colonial outlook. Under certain conditions, therefore, 
the use of mythology and of ideological mobilisation can also play a neocoloniser role and be an 
obstacle of decolonisation”6 (Chávez 2011: 17). 
 
6 In the original - “Al usar la mitología indígena y el discurso de recuperación de su cultura para crear una 
imagen intemporal de la misma, sería otra forma de reproducción de una mirada colonial. En determinadas 
condiciones, por tanto, el recurso a la mitología y a la movilización ideológica puede también jugar un papel 
neocolonizador y ser un obstáculo a la descolonización”. 
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Some authors, like Pedro Portugal, historian and journalist7, advocate the first of the 
aforementioned routes to achieve decolonisation, by rejecting the frames of the colonial 
domination altogether, attempting to decolonise the very notion of decolonisation, which he 
maintains is a construct of the colonial, Western mind, which sees alterity and otherness as a 
mechanism of discovering itself, and can lead to a new discourse of subordination (Portugal 
2011). This is precisely what Morales and his government are very often accused of, namely 
by those in the so-called Media Luna and by intellectuals adhering to this thesis. However, 
Portugal does not completely oppose such a use of identity as a key aspect of decolonisation, 
stating that stoking identity feelings would “only be an initial phase of the liberation process”8 
(Portugal 2011: 89), after which decolonisation must be sought by enacting concrete acts 
towards the challenge of self-governance. His biggest critique is directed towards the 
postcolonial discourse in Bolivia, where some posit its “legacy as trying to maintain and petrify 
that type of discourse, considering it [what he calls “identity exacerbation”] not a step along a 
decolonising sequence, but decolonisation itself” (ibid). From a more practical point of view, 
Pedro Portugal defines decolonisation as “the process through which Peoples who were 
dispossessed of self-governance by a foreign invasion recover their self-determination”, as “a 
basic process of liberation and autonomy” and with “independence as an inevitable 
consequence” (Portugal 2011: 66). 
In essence and in practicality, it would amount to the “liberation and reconstitution of Incaic 
civilisation” (Chávez 2011: 20) at the time of the Spanish conquest, started in 1532. This 
process of decolonisation implies many things; on the one hand, the structure and consolidation 
of its [the Indigenous Peoples’] “own race and culture”, rejecting Western or European culture, 
ideas and materiality as “antagonists of the project of an Incaic society rebuilding” (ibid), is a 
fundamental part of the course to follow. This refusal to incorporate these mental and 
ontological frameworks would extend to the criollo society, on the basis of its structure having 
been erected upon “the disintegration of Indigenous Peoples” and that Indigenous Peoples could 
“not incorporate their aspirations of themselves for its [the criollo society’s] very illegitimate 
existence would be the condition of the inexistence of the Indigenous nation”(ibid); in a way, 
accepting the validity of one would negate the other. 
 
7 Pedro Portugal Mollinedo is, coincidentally, author of some of the articles analysed for this thesis, written in 
Página Siete, and the editor of Pukara, a publication dedicated to Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia. 
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On the other hand, the second part of understanding what decolonisation entails is perhaps even 
more complex; the question brought forth relates to how and under which structure would this 
new Incaic nation be organised and devised. Portugal does not necessarily refuse the structuring 
of this emergent entity through and around the idea of the nation-state, itself profoundly 
European and embedded with colonial ideas, arguing that “decolonisation must be 
contemporaneous” (Portugal 2011: 93), that is, “handling current conditions”, in a sense of 
understanding and mediating this process of change through the existing power structures and 
the fabric of the existing society today. One could argue that an outright rejection of the criollo 
society which has emerged since the colonial era, albeit accurately denounced as having risen 
on the back of and by the disappearance of the Indigenous Peoples’ one, would be difficult to 
understand as “contemporaneous”, as he himself defines it. Patricia Chávez, on the other hand, 
highlights the apparent contradiction of this stance, mentioning that there were indeed these 
very same power structures and control mechanisms which enabled the perpetuation of 
inequality. Her fundamental question is then, in an attempt to manoeuvre around this problem, 
how one can “accommodate both the current power with those given to Indigenous 
communities” (Chávez 2011: 22) and if they are even compatible. 
Some authors, however, offer different understandings of decolonisation and what it means. 
Although decolonisation is also “the overcoming of colonial elements that deny Indigenous 
Peoples’ social organisation forms” (Chávez 2011: 24), Roberto Choque, for instance, does not 
regard the nation-state and Indigenous Peoples’ as necessarily antagonistic, because both actors 
can, under the current socio-political context, take the discourse of decolonisation from theory 
to practice, enshrining it legally and constitutionally. Decolonisation then, according to Roberto 
Choque, should be a process whose aim is to recover the history, identity, self-esteem and 
ancestral values of the Indigenous Peoples, as well as their cosmovision and spiritual 
understandings (Choque 2011: 56). Decolonisation, thus, should focus on revaluing “the 
ancestral knowledge of Indigenous Peoples and Nations, intercultural and Afro-Bolivian 
communities” and eliminating “practices based on feudal, patrimonial, patriarchal, racist and 
bureaucratic” principles (Choque 2011: 53). 
By understanding decolonisation as a liberating process to many other besides Indigenous 
Peoples, Choque’s notion can be understood as an umbrella term to face “all forms of social, 
cultural and economic exclusion”, fighting for the “civil and political rights” of those “seeking 
equality and justice” (Choque 2011: 55). Though this process of an all-encompassing 
decolonisation, reeling in all other social struggles, would need intense dialogue and constant 
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negotiating between its constituent parts not to repeat the same patterns of power inequalities, 
how can it be undertaken if championed by the nation-state, which, according to Patricia 
Chávez herself, “tends to reproduce colonial principles in matters of decision making, power 
administration, hierarchical organisation and stratification” (Chávez 2011: 27)? 
Although there is a constant flux of influences between different cultural frameworks, meaning 
that neither “side” is immune to and beyond contact and impact, the level of intensity and the 
power of said interactions is far from proportional; Indigenous cultures do influence the culture 
of Western capitalism but the latter frames the relationship with the former through a lens of 
domination and subordination, one which an intercultural approach might help disentangle. 
This interculturality outlook must also be exerted when dealing with different groups of 
Indigenous Peoples, as such a multiplicity of societies can’t be understood as a single, 
homogeneous mass devoid of distinct groups, ideas, cosmologies, wants and wills, but as active 
and subject of its own place in a web of interconnectivity, negotiating cultures, spaces and 
identities actively. 
5.2 Identity 
The problematic of cultural identity has been debated endlessly, from angles and perspectives 
that range from the more essentialising and solid (Friedman 1994) to the less-defining and 
liquid (Ewing 1990, Bauman 2000). From this debate has emerged the notion that the “old 
identities which stabilized the social world for so long are in decline, giving rise to new 
identities fragmenting the modern individual as a unified subject” (Hall 1996: 596). 
Tracing back the concept historically, Hall distinguishes between three concepts of identity; of 
the Enlightenment, sociological (modern) and post-modern subjects (Hall 1996). The 
Enlightenment subject revolved around a “centered, unified individual” (ibid: 597), subjected 
to little morphing from birth to death. It has been understood and attached to the idea of 
nationhood since the advent in eighteen-century Europe of nation-states as we know them 
(Macdonald 2006), mainly due to the concise efforts of the countries themselves and the need 
to assert a common denominator amongst its inhabitants (Dervin 2012), a concept that, as 
echoed by Hall, has been shaken by the fast-paced change characteristic of contemporary 
societies (Hall 1996). The modern, or sociological, subject was a mirror image of its 
surrounding world, gaining consciousness of the lack of individual autonomy and independence 
and the role of other mediating forces; this concept reinforces the idea that identity is “formed 
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in the “interaction” between self and society”, creating the connection between the individual 
and the public sphere that surrounds it (Hall 1996: 597), sewing them together, allowing for a 
malleable adaptation from the part of the subject. This kind of identity, which has become the 
norm when talking about the topic, is the one that has been seen by some scholars as liquid 
(Bauman 2000) or under tremendous stress, becoming “fragmented”, with “several, sometimes 
contradictory or unresolved, identities” (Hall 1996: 598), leading to an identification procedure 
that has become “more open-ended, variable, and problematic” (ibid), which culminates in the 
third of Hall’s identity subjects, the post-modern one. The post-modern subject’s identity is 
continuously and perpetually shifting and being reshaped, delineated by its surrounding cultural 
arrangements and historical context; in a sense, the “subject assumes different identities at 
different times, identities which are not unified around a coherent “self”” (Hall 1996: 598), in 
stark contrast with the first identity understanding, often still embodied by nation-states. 
Howarth, similarly, understands postmodernity’s (or perhaps liquid modernity’s?) identity as 
“an individual’s sense of who they are in relation to others around them. This simultaneously 
incorporates a sense of belonging and shared knowledge and a sense of difference and 
individuality” (Howarth 2011: 2), an attitude that recognises that “people cross various 
collective and individual positioning and voices on a daily basis, which can be opposed” 
(Dervin 2012: 184) and even seemingly incompatible. As Ewing puts it regarding our current 
understanding of identity: 
“in all cultures people can be observed to project multiple, inconsistent self-representations that are context 
dependent and may shift rapidly. At any particular moment a person usually experiences his or her 
articulated self as a symbolic, timeless whole, but this self may quickly be displaced by another, quite 
different “self”, which is based on a different definition of the situation” (Ewing 1990: 251) 
Dervin, likewise, argues that culture can’t be anything but “plural, changing, adaptable, 
constructed”, for that malleability is its most essential feature; in his own words, “a culture that 
does not change and exchange with other cultures is a dead culture” (Dervin 2012: 182). Some 
authors go even further in dealing with culture, arguing that the very concept is obsolete and 
inappropriate to account for our current cultural diversity (Abdallah-Pretceille 2006), a 
multiplicity echoed by Bauman (2000). Hall’s two approaches towards cultural identity 
resonate with this work; on the one hand, cultural identity can be understood as a macro-
structure, a “one, shared culture” or, as he himself says, a sort of a “one true self” (Hall 1990: 
223), reflecting a common shared history and “one people” that constitutes the main reference 
backdrop against which all other (albeit possibly significant) differences are minimised, often 
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a feature of the Pan-fill-in-the-blank movements (and present in the Pan-Indigenism of Bolivia). 
On the other hand, cultural identity is significantly related to the process of “becoming”, rather 
than being a pre-existing entity that is (and has been) immune to constant entropy and fluidity. 
Without denying the historical origin of a certain cultural identity, Hall repels the possibility of 
it being “eternally fixed in some essentialised past” by virtue of being “subject to the continuous 
“play” of history, culture and power” (ibid: 225). 
5.3 Indigeneity 
Much like most of cultural studies’ concepts, indigeneity and its precise contours are hard to 
delineate. This difficulty is two-fold and stems from two seemingly disconnected branches but 
conceptually closer cognates; on the one hand, the initial struggle runs along the ones above 
mentioned about essentialising terms and solidifying cultural concepts and ideas. What does it 
mean to be Indigenous? What does it entail and what does it preclude? On the other hand, lies 
the problem of identification. Who is Indigenous? And who gets to decide/define who is and 
who is not? Current practice answers our second predicament by leaving such a burden on those 
that identify thusly, the Indigenous communities and groups themselves. It has been the 
accepted international standard since the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, now dissolved, 
promulgated a declaration in 1977 that stated that only Indigenous Peoples had the right to 
define Indigenous Peoples (Corntassel 2003). 
This current dilemma has gained increasingly more attention as self-proclaimed Indigenous 
Peoples have risen to positions of real political agency throughout many parts of the world, 
namely in South America and in Bolivia. Indigeneity in Bolivia has, therefore, changed 
considerably throughout time. This “movement” was, between 1952 and 1971, a markedly 
“cultural elite movement which advocated for the continuation of the traditional cultural 
practices and opposed the modernisation of the Indigenous communities” (Chachaki 2015: 
215), an attitude no longer widely advocated by many. Specifically, being Indigenous has many 
layers of meaning in Bolivia. Not only has this marker become “a rights - and resource - bearing 
identity” (Weber 2013: 194) but it has also garnered new meanings since Evo Morales has risen 
to power and the Movimiento al Socialismo has tried to promote a “more inclusive urban-based 
indigeneity that seeks to embrace the Bolivian public” (ibid). These political happenings have 
catapulted Indigenous identity and indigeneity to the forefront of the nation’s public discussion 
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arenas, with more and more nationals seeing themselves as part of the broad scope of the term 
“Indigenous” (Canessa 2007). 
Some authors, such as Ranta, define indigeneity as “a historically constructed, mobile and 
multiple term which articulates a set of positions and struggles” (Ranta 2014: 60), arguing that 
every self-identification by Indigenous groups is a “positioning” historically contextualised and 
particular, and reshaping all their relations with those framed within this articulation. 
Indigeneity, like ethnicity, “can be defined as the social and cultural constructions of specific 
peoples that share common traits including ancestry, language, beliefs, values, and so forth” 
(ibid), but it differs in three particular features, in the sense that it presupposes a shared global 
identity, a framework established by international law and a presence and occupation of a 
certain territory. 
Framing this macro-Indigenous movement within which the Bolivian one is inserted are the 
International Labour Organization’s Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention of 1989 and 
the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 2007, legal documents that estipulate 
the definitions of Indigenous Peoples, while at the same time stating that self-identification is 
the main criterion to determine indigeneity. This internationalised framework has removed 
some of the constant back and forth of identity performing, “normalising” indigeneity, at least 
from a legal standpoint. According to UN stipulations, “any definition of indigenous peoples 
has to include four criteria: first, priority in time in respect to specific territory; second, cultural 
distinctiveness; third, self-identification; and fourth, an experience of discrimination, 
dispossession and marginalisation” (Ranta 2014: 61). That is not to say that all Indigenous 
groups are the same nor that they have the same situations, be they political, social and/or 
economical, only that the Indigenous movements have grown stronger internationally on the 
basis of what unites them, even though this tactic of strategic essentialism, as some have called 
it, simplifies a cultural discussion in order to give voices to those that have none (Spivak 2006), 
sometimes at the price of being essentialised to “qualify as indigenous in global forums” (Ranta 
2014: 62) and have a voice. 
Some authors have delved into indigeneity in Bolivia, seeing it as a constant negotiation, with 
profound social and political implications. Nancy Postero analyses Bolivian indigeneity in the 
Morales era through the prism of power relations and how Indigenous Peoples have dealt with 
enduring structures of racism and inequality, and how they are reshaping their own role as 
political actors, claiming recognition and inclusion. According to the author, indigeneity and 
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its constant negotiation have changed dramatically since Morales’ first electoral victory in 2005 
and especially since the refounding of the state in 2009, for “native peoples and their customs 
have become the icons of a new plurinational society” (Postero 2013: 107). Postero recaps what 
the concept of indigeneity has meant in Bolivia throughout its history, again reinforcing the 
flexible conceptualisation of the term, noting, like Ranta, that “indigeneity is a historically 
contingent formulation that changes over time, and it is a relational concept that emerges from 
contested social fields of difference and sameness” and, because of that constant negotiated 
space,  “who counts as ‘indigenous’ is a fundamentally political question, since such 
representations emerge from struggles over particular social, cultural, and economic matters 
during particular moments” (Postero 2013: 108). 
Regardless of Indigenous Peoples’ attempts to overcome this stereotyped vision of their own 
identity, “Indians were still considered obstacles to national progress” and “the antithesis of 
modernity” (Postero 2013: 109) during much of the Republican era until the rise of Evo 
Morales. This outlook towards Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia led to the ubiquity of the preferred 
term for Indigenous Peoples in the country, originarios campesino, a remnant from the 1952 
Revolution; as its own attempt to solve what Postero calls “the Indian Question”, the “category 
of Indian was erased and rural peoples were considered campesinos, or peasants; their 
difference elided to produce a mestizo nation” (Postero 2013: 109). Therefore, the re-
emergence of the term ‘Indigenous’ only came in the 1980s and 1990s riding a global wave of 
Indigenous Peoples rights, with different strategies employed by distinct groups; whereas 
“lowland groups organized around indigenous identity and demands for territory”, those of the 
highlands “organized around cultural recognition and political participation” (ibid). 
In sum, indigeneity in Bolivia has moved from being, in the 1980s and 1990s, a “platform for 
reclaiming natural resources from the oligarchy and from transnational corporations”, to 
meaning nowadays an Indigenous cosmovision as a ‘scaled up’ “resource for saving the planet” 
(Postero 2013: 110), which can be attested by the political usage of vivir bien by Morales and 
his government (Ranta 2014). It is still a “concept critical both for governing the nation and for 
contesting the meaning of the nation and the role of Indigenous Peoples within it” (Postero 
2013: 109), and Evo Morales has used indigeneity heavily as a means to legitimise his political 
program.  
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6 Framing Theory  
The concept of framing theory and frame analysis has been developed more and more since the 
early 1970’s, with Erving Goffman’s Frame Analysis being a seminal work in the study of 
frames through the prism of Sociology and Social Psychology. Whereas Goffman describes 
frames as “definitions of a situation (…) built up in accordance with principles of organization 
which govern events – at least social ones – and our subjective involvement in them” (Goffman 
1976: 10-11), the usage of the term and its relevancy within Communication Studies is more 
prevalent to this analysis. In that realm, Robert M. Entman’s Framing: Toward Clarification of 
a Fractured Paradigm is the starting point for positioning frame analysis within the scope of 
this work. Entman describes the concept of framing as one which “consistently offers a way to 
describe the power of a communicating text” and “illuminates the precise way in which 
influence over a human consciousness is exerted by the transfer (or communication) of 
information from one location – such as a speech, utterance, news report, or novel – to that 
consciousness” (Entman 1993: 51-52). Entman lists the basic features of framing as twofold; 
on the one hand, there is selection, while on the other hand there is salience. In defining these 
two concepts, Entman expands on what framing is by adding that: 
“to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (Entman 
1993: 52). 
Frames, in this perspective, “define problems”, “diagnose causes”, “make moral judgements” 
and “suggest remedies” (Entman 1993). These four characteristics are not all always 
necessarily present in every frame, although some of them may occur simultaneously as well. 
Alongside these four features, Entman also positions frames in four distinct locales of the 
communication process; the communicator, the text, the receiver and the culture (Entman 1993: 
52). Communicators decide what is conveyed and how, and which frames, which he calls 
schemata, are used as organising guidelines. These decisions are not always done consciously, 
as these underlying principles can go unperceived even to the communicator itself. The texts 
themselves, therefore, contain the frames instilled by the communicators, “manifested by the 
presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of 
information, and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or 
judgements” (Entman 1993: 52). However, the frames chosen and used by the communicator 
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in the text are not necessarily the ones that the receiver uses to make sense of the information 
conveyed. To that effect, the last of the locations in which Entman posits frames, culture, can 
be more relevant, as culture is understood in this sense as “the stock of commonly invoked 
frames”, as the “empirically demonstrable set of common frames exhibited in the discourse and 
thinking of most people in a social grouping” (ibid: 53). The act of framing, therefore, as 
mentioned above, selects and highlights, using the features which it decides to emphasise to 
argue about an existing problem, what causes it, how it is assessed and what can be done to 
solve it. 
Stephen Reese, in his Prologue - Framing Public Life (2001), expands the conceptual 
framework and defines frames as “organizing principles that are socially shared and persistent 
over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world” (Reese 2001: 5). 
Some other authors, such as Pan and Kosicki (1993), suggest that frames are connected and 
intertwined by the presence of four structures in frames (syntactical, script, thematic, and 
rhetorical), whereas Gamson and Modigliani (1989) identify framing devices such as 
metaphors, catchphrases, exemplars, depictions, and visual images9. Reese’s framing model 
leads to many questions regarding the topic and focuses particularly on power relationships, 
institutions and how these create and “support certain routine and persistent ways of making 
sense of the social world” (Reese 2001: 12). This is particularly important in regards to the 
present study, as frames are “connected to asymmetric interests” and “the power to frame 
depends on access to resources, a store of knowledge, and strategic alliances” (ibid), which then 
set the table for what becomes normalised discourse and practices. 
7 Material and Methodology  
The research data consists of 72 articles in total, collected from the online repositories of 
Cambio (18), El Deber (20), La Razón (12) and Página Siete (22). The four newspapers were 
chosen for different reasons, pertinent to the particular aim of this research. Whereas the first 
three (El Deber, La Razón, and Página Siete) are the biggest media outlets by circulation in the 
country and/or the leading newspapers in their regions (as is the case with El Deber, from Santa 
Cruz, Bolivia’s most populous city), Cambio was chosen because it is the state’s official 
 
9 The specifically linguistic nature of these two analyses, although important and acknowledged in this study, were 
not part of the methodology of my own examination. 
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newspaper, providing an insight into the government’s position on the topic. The preliminary 
query to retrieve the articles was conducted under the search terms of “indígena” (Indigenous 
(person), in Spanish), though the first results were generally too broad and included articles 
whose scope fell outside of the aim of this study. The articles were then chosen according to 
their pertinence as it relates to the topic of Indigenous peoples’ representations, which was done 
initially by skimming out the less detailed ones and retaining those which contained substantial 
information about the topic at hand. 
The methodologies chosen to analyse the articles were that of frame analysis and of content 
analysis, in order to try and provide a better contextual understanding of the data collected. 
Frame analysis, however, represents the bulk of the analysis here conducted and the results 
presented derive mainly from this approach. The method used was an adaption of different 
methodologies, in order to better suit the work at hand.  Semetko and Valkenburg propose a 
five-frame analysis of the news in their study about European politics in the Netherlands. This 
five-frame analysis stems from an attempt to systematise framing studies and analyses to 
improve intercoder reliability via the usage of a binary coding strategy, facilitating a broader 
and quantitative study. 
According to these authors in their study in 2000, “Framing European Politics: A Content 
Analysis of Press and Television News”, there are two distinct analytical possibilities when it 
comes to studying frames in the news: an inductive and a deductive approach. The inductive 
approach focuses on “analyzing a news story with an open view to attempt to reveal the array 
of possible frames, beginning with very loosely defined preconceptions of these frames” 
(Semetko & Valkenburg 2000: 94). Although it provides a much deeper and more thorough 
analysis, the inductive method is labour intensive and hard to replicate, producing better results 
when the sample size of analysis is small. On the other hand, and as an attempt to systematise 
the methodology in the field of frame analysis, Semetko and Valkenburg postulate the 
deductive approach as “predefining certain frames as content analytic variables to verify the 
extent to which these frames occur in the news” (ibid). According to the authors, “this approach 
makes it necessary to have a clear idea of the kinds of frames likely to be in the news, because 
the frames that are not defined a priori may be overlooked” and, more advantageously perhaps, 
“this approach can be replicated easily, can cope with large samples, and can easily detect 
differences in framing between media (e.g., television vs press) and within media (e.g., 
highbrow news programs or newspapers vs. tabloid-style media)” (ibid: 94-95). Using 
  32 
Neuman’s10 study as a reference point for frame analysis, Semetko & Valkenburg investigated 
five key, major frames, which served as an inspirational methodology for this study; conflict 
frame, human interest frame, economic consequences frame, morality frame and responsibility 
frame11. 
Some other authors have gone further in their attempts to improve reliability and scientific 
validity. Matthes & Kohring, in their 2008 study, The Content Analysis of Media Frames: 
Toward Improving Reliability and Validity, expound on many other approaches used in the 
content analysis of media frames, while pointing out the limitations of the deductive approach 
used in this paper and proposed by Semetko & Valkenburg. The authors point out its 
shortcomings; the emphasis on capturing “the latent or cultural meanings of a text”, the lack of 
understanding about “which elements should be present in an article or news story to signify 
the existence of a frame”, and the inherent difficulty in content analysis when it comes to 
reliability are all points of criticism regarding this method (Mattes & Kohring 2008: 263). 
Regarding this thesis specifically, the method chosen was that proposed by Semetko and 
Valkenburg (Semetko & Valkenburg 2000), incorporating and adapting aspects from Cheas’ 
(Cheas 2017) research on the width and breadth of media frames, while at the same time 
acknowledging the limitations pointed out by Matthes and Kohring. To find the frames, I 
adapted and used Cheas’ methodology, itself inspired by Semetko’s and Valkenburg’s, to better 
suit the present topic. In doing so, the initial methodology’s five frames (Conflict, Human 
Interest, Economic Consequences, Morality and Responsibility frames) were ultimately 
reconfigured to Conflict, Credibility, (Political) Agency, Identity, (De)Colonisation, and 
Responsibility frames. Cheas devised a set of questions, inspired, again, by Semetko’s and 
Valkenburg’s methodology, which can be used to verify the existence of the frames in news 
articles. The Responsibility, Conflict, and Credibility frames (as well as the queries to encounter 
them) were adapted from her work (Cheas 2017). The remaining frames (Identity, (De) 
Colonisation, and (Political) Agency and their respective questions were created for the analysis 
of this study, mimicking the previous frames in content. 
 
10 Neuman, W. Russell, Marion R. Just, and Ann N. Crigler. 1992. Common Knowledge: News and the 
Construction of Political Meaning. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
11 As explained in the methodology chapter of this thesis, these five frames were adapted to the topic according to 
their relevance to the analysis; the conflict and responsibility frames were kept, while a credibility, (political) 
agency, identity and (de)colonisation frames were added, and the human interest, economic consequences, and 
morality frames were dropped/adapted/morphed into the aforementioned additional ones. 
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Unlike in Cheas’, or in Semetko’s and Valkenburg’s frame analysis methodology, the frames 
for this research were not all consisting of an even number of questions. Whereas the Conflict, 
Credibility, (Political) Agency, and Responsibility frames consisted each of 4 questions, the 
Identity frame was composed of 8 questions, and the (De) Colonisation frame contained 6 
questions, which leads to valid criticism about the true proportionality of the frames, although 
the extra questions almost always occurred overlapping with four initial ones. All frames had 
an even number of negative and positive dimensions within themselves. The inclusion of 
neutral dimensions was not undertaken due to the limited scope of this analysis and its limited 
occurrence. Much like Cheas points out in her work, coverage was either “clearly positive or 
negative rather than neutral” (Cheas 2017: 78) most of the time, therefore reducing the need to 
code for neutral frames. In conducting frame analysis for this topic, similar results were 
encountered and therefore neutral frames, scarce as they were, are not included in this study. 
The unit of analysis was the paragraph, with each of them being coded for the amount of codes 
occurring within it. Naturally, some codes, and therefore frames, overlapped, making it hard to 
quantify which one would be the one setting the tone. In these cases, both codes were marked 
as occurring. The table containing the questions, dimensions and frames coded and found can 
also be founded in the appendices section of this thesis. 
8 Results and Analysis 
The analysis is outlined in different sections (one per newspaper) and their respective sub-
sections (one per frame); each newspaper is analysed individually in its totally and each of the 
frames are analysed within each newspaper. The breakdown was conducted to highlight the 
differences between the publications and to better understand what role each frame played in 
the overall discourse endorsed by each of the four different media outlets. The articles are 
henceforth referred to by their numbers, for an easier reading of the text. The complete graphics 
illustrating the presence of each individual code and of each frame can also be found in the 
appendices12. 
 
12 A full rundown of the articles and their respective titles can be found in the annexes, subdivided by publication. 
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8.1 Cambio 
The analysis of the State’s own publication, Cambio, revealed much of the aforementioned 
political emphasis on topics such as decolonisation, and the political and civil empowerment of 
the Indigenous population of Bolivia. The governmental discourse relied heavily on the stoking 
of identity and identity markers as key features in achieving these goals. The articles analysed 
stemmed from three different years (six from 2016, eight from 2017 and four from 2018), in 
order to have a wider range of topics and situations covered. There were 18 articles examined 
and a total of 509 coded occurrences. 
In the 18 articles analysed, the Identity, Responsibility, and (De) Colonisation frames were 
the ones charted most often. With a prevalence of 28,1% (143 out of 509), 23,4% (119 out of 
509) and 20,6% (105 out of 509), respectively, these frames set the tone when it came to 
Cambio’s representation of Indigenous Peoples. The remaining frames - (Political) Agency, 
Conflict, and Credibility – were present in more moderate numbers, amounting, respectively, 
to 12% (61 out of 509), 11% (56 out of 509), and 4,9% (25 out of 509). Within all these frames, 
the distinction between negative and positive dimensions was also analysed, to better 
understand in which ways framing occurred. Of the ten least frequently occurring codes, as 
defined by the chart mentioned above in the methodology chapter, 7 out of them fall under the 
category of negative. By contrast, 6 out of the 10 most frequently occurring frames were 
categorised as positive. Out of the 18 articles examined, the code under the headline of 
“Indigenous identity opposed to Western/Criollo identity” (the most commonly occurring 
of the individual codes) was present in 14 of them. The prevalence of this code fell in line with 
the governmental discourse employed by Morales, in which Indigenous Peoples and their 
identity are constantly represented in opposition to Criollo or “westernised” Bolivians. This 
discourse resorted to this and other “othering” methods as the backbone of the new State-backed 
indigeneity, based on ethnic purity and dualistic contrasts, as previously discussed. 
The five most commonly occurring individual codes were “Indigenous identity opposed to 
Western/Criollo identity” (52 occurrences out of 509 – 10,2%), “Responsible for a 
particular situation” (46 out of 509 – 9%), “Colonial time negatively” (43 out of 509 – 8,4%), 
“Affected by a particular situation” (41 out of 509 – 8,1%) and “Indigenous Peoples 
(political) agency described positively” (39 out of 509 – 7,7%). In contrast, the five least 
commonly occurring codes were “Decolonisation as illegitimate” (0 out of 509 – 0%), 
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“Indigenous Peoples acting worse than expected” (0 out of 509 – 0%), “Pre-Columbian 
identity negatively” (2 out of 509 – 0,39%), “Colonial time positively” (2 out of 509 – 0,39%) 
and “Concern about Indigenous Peoples ability to handle situations” (2 out of 509 – 
0,39%), whose absence shed favourable light on Indigenous Peoples, while contrasting it with 
the non-Indigenous Bolivia. 
8.1.1 Conflict Frame 
The Conflict Frame was composed, like all the others, of negative and positive codes. The 
negative codes in the conflict frame were “Negative confrontations” (the most common of the 
codes in the Conflict Frame), and “Mutual reproaching”. These two codes occurred in 
instances where the discourse constantly lumped Indigenous Peoples and the MAS 
governmental programme together, as partners and side by side, and framed the political 
opposition as anti-Indigenous, not just against the government and their proceso de cambio but 
also against Indigenous groups in general. Some of these texts were quite politically charged 
and reflect the intertwined nature of indigeneity, Indigenous Peoples and the MAS government 
in Bolivia. As an example, regarding Indigenous autonomies, vice-president Álvaro García 
Linera urges those leading the process to “be careful with what they do because those who 
despise indigenous persons want this [indigenous autonomy] to fail”13(Article 4). 
Most of the “Negative confrontations” occurrences have a temporal component to it, in the 
sense that they mostly relate to the turbulent colonial and early republican past of Bolivia. There 
is a constant reminder, as if need be, of “500 years of resistance” and of Indigenous heroes of 
yesteryear such as Bartolina Sisa, Tupak Katari and Avelino Siñani. However, they are not 
limited to the distant past; the allusions to an exclusively Indigenous Nation – “if only the 
Indians ruled, this world would be a better place”14 (Article 9) – act as a perfect example. On 
the other hand, the positive codes in the conflict frame were “Positive agreements” and 
“Peaceful coexistence”.  These occurred very sparsely, only to highlight the partnership and 
sociopolitical symbiosis between the MAS government and Indigenous Peoples and groups 
(Article 11), as well as in relation to the allegedly equitable importance, relevance and 
prevalence of Spanish and Indigenous languages (Article 2). 
 
13 In the original, “cuidar lo que hacen porque quienes desprecian a los indígenas quieren que esto fracase”. 
14 In the original, “sí sólo reinaran los indios, este mundo sería mejor”. 
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8.1.2 Credibility Frame 
In the Credibility Frame, the negative codes were “Concern about Indigenous Peoples’ 
ability to handle situations” and “Indigenous Peoples acting worse than expected”, which 
related mostly to Indigenous Peoples’ behaviour and expectations about it. This frame was the 
one occurring the least amount of times, representing only 5% of all the coded instances in 
Cambio. The first code appears only twice, highlighting the hardship Indigenous Peoples 
endure due to a lack of resources and in relation to the foundational processes of republican 
Bolivia, when Indigenous Peoples were barred from schools while citizenship was only granted 
to those able to read and write. The second one is completely absent. 
The positive codes, “Indigenous Peoples’ ability to handle situations” and “Indigenous 
Peoples acting evenly/better than expected”, on the other hand, were only slightly more 
present. The first of these two codes appears 14 times and the second one 9 times, underscoring 
how Indigenous Peoples manage their heritage successfully (Article 1), are competent 
professionals (Article 10), democratic and civil leaders (Article 11), entrepreneurial and 
independent (Article 13), and are politically active, and were even during the colonial and the 
republican era (Article 15), combating and rejecting stigmas of lack of agency and participation 
attached to Indigenous groups. 
8.1.3 (Political) Agency Frame 
In this frame, the negative codes were “Indigenous Peoples’ political agency negatively” and 
“Indigenous Peoples’ lack of resources to achieve”. The first code appears a scant three 
times, only in reference to how Indigenous People’s political agency was perceived during the 
early republican past by those attempting to assimilate them (Articles 15 and 18). The second 
one is relatively more present, occurring 14 times, conveying the deficiencies and privations 
withstood by Indigenous Peoples, from a lack of money to preserve their history (Article 1), to 
water shortages (Article 4) to difficulties in access to schooling (Article 7). 
The positive codes, “Indigenous Peoples’ political agency positively” and “Indigenous 
Peoples’ abundance of resources to achieve”, were a bit more common than the negative 
ones, though still occurring at different rates. The first one is the fifth most commonly found 
code in Cambio, appearing 39 times. It is found when exulting indigenous resistance during 
colonial times (Articles 3, 5 and 12), addressing indigenous autonomy processes (Article 4), 
  37 
celebrating indigenous festivities (Article 6) or the fight for equality in education for Indigenous 
Peoples (Articles 7, 8 and 10). The second one appears only five times, alluding to the recently 
implemented social and political changes which have brought Indigenous Peoples to the social 
and political forefront (Articles 8, 9 and 10), revealing that although some progress towards 
equality has been achieved, there is still much to be done. 
8.1.4 Identity Frame 
The Identity Frame was the one perhaps most central to this thesis, alongside the (De) 
Colonisation frame, and therefore comprised eight codes. The negative codes in this frame 
were “Indigenous Peoples’ identity negatively”, “Denying Indigenous Peoples’ identity 
markers”, “Pre-Columbian identity negatively” and “Indigenous identity opposed to 
Criollo/Western”. These codes appear very rarely, with the exception of “Indigenous identity 
opposed to Criollo/Western”, and always exposing the lack of understanding Indigenous 
Peoples still encounter (Article 17) and were forced to live with in both the colonial and 
republican pasts (Articles 12 and 18). The code “Indigenous identity opposed to 
Criollo/Western” is the most commonly occurring in the articles analysed from Cambio, 
appearing 52 times. It is employed both in regards to the past (Articles 2, 3, 5, 12 and 14) and 
to the current state of affairs (Articles 4 and 11), pitting Indigenous Peoples against the 
remaining Bolivian society, along alleged ethnical purity line. 
The positive codes (“Indigenous Peoples’ identity positively”, “Ascribing/relaying 
Indigenous Peoples’ identity markers”, “Pre-Columbian identity positively” and 
“Indigenous identity equated/related to Criollo/Western”) all occur in similar numbers (27, 
23, and 21, respectively), with only the last one, “Indigenous identity equated/related to 
Criollo/Western”, deviating from the norm, appearing only 8 times, in stark contrast with its 
opposite, “Indigenous identity opposed to Criollo/Western”. These highlight how 
Indigenous identity and traditions are widespread and ubiquitous (Article 2), how Indigenous 
identity is allegedly more gender equal15 (Articles 3, 5 and 6), how Indigenous Peoples have 
resisted and rebelled against colonial and external forces (Articles 9 and 12), their political 
agency (Article 11), and how equality can be achieved through the inclusion of Indigenous 
knowledge (Articles 10 and 17) into the public and national discourse. The code “Indigenous 
 
15 Although it is not the concern of this thesis, a gender framed analysis of Bolivian Indigenous Peoples and the 
media could be a fertile study ground, especially as it relates to the State publications and the social imagery of 
cholas. 
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identity equated/related to Criollo/Western” occurs to highlight the syncretic nature of 
modern Indigenous Bolivians – somewhat contrasting, or perhaps complementing, the dualistic 
discourse of Indigenous purity vs. criollo society (Article 2), to empower Indigenous Peoples 
and dismantle fixed notions of what an Indigenous person looks and behaves like (Articles 3, 6 
and 13) and how well educated and politically active Indigenous Peoples can be (Articles 10 
and 11). 
8.1.5 (De) Colonisation Frame 
This frame, like the previous one, contains more codes (six in total) than the four which 
compose all the others. The negative codes are “Decolonisation as negative/difficult”, 
“Decolonisation as illegitimate”, and “Colonial time positively”, which occur very rarely, 
appearing only 7, 0, and 2 times, respectively. “Decolonisation as negative/difficult”, for 
instance, appears only to demonstrate the difficulties Indigenous Peoples still encounter in 
regards to being fully recognised and respected (Articles 17 and 18). 
The positive codes, “Decolonisation as positive/possible”, “Decolonisation as legitimate”, 
and “Colonial time negatively”, contrastingly, appear abundantly throughout the articles 
analysed, numbering 24, 29, and 43 occurrences, respectively, promoting decolonisation as a 
goal to be achieved, not just through political projects and decrees but also on a personal level, 
a change within the common Bolivian’s grasp, rejecting essentialised stigmas and stereotypes. 
These can be found in relation to Indigenous autonomy (Article 4) , to Indigenous rights 
(Articles 6 and 7), to the incorporation of Indigenous history into the national psyche and 
historical consciousness (Articles 5 and 9), and to the re-appropriation and reshaping of days 
and festivities such as the Día de la descolonización (Article 3), formally known, and still 
known in some places throughout the world today, as Columbus Day or Día de la Raza. The 
instances in which these positive codes of the (De)colonisation frame appear always convey a 
message of defiance, urging Indigenous Bolivians to challenge the status quo and working 
towards reverting systemic and structural disadvantages facing the majority of the nation. 
8.1.6 Responsibility Frame 
The Responsibility Frame was the second most commonly found frame. It is particularly 
notable that it constitutes 23% of all the frames with only four codes/questions, in contrast with 
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the other two most common ones (Identity Frame – 28% and (De) Colonisation Frame - 
21%), composed of eight and six codes, respectively. 
The negative codes (“Responsible for a particular situation” and “Affected by a particular 
situation”) are by far the most common ones representing the Responsibility Frame, with 46 
and 41 occurrences respectively. The former is used extensively in highlighting the role of the 
Spanish invaders regarding the many injustices Indigenous Peoples endured during the colonial 
era (Articles 2, 3, 5, and 14), but also how the Republican period didn’t change much of this 
unequal situation (Articles 7, 9, and 15), equating criollos and Spaniards when it comes to 
perpetuating the existent power, economic, and social imbalances in Bolivia. The latter is the 
reverse side of the same coin, stressing who was always on the other end of this unequal 
struggle; it illustrates how Indigenous Peoples’ traditional practices and beliefs were forbidden, 
dismantled and abandoned with the arrival of the European colonisers (Articles 2, 3, and 5), 
how a lack of access to education has prevented them from reaching power and decision-
making positions (Articles 7, 9, and 15), and how a fundamentally different and clashing 
worldview has shaped Bolivia to their disadvantage (Articles 14, 17, and 18). 
The positive codes (“Solved a particular situation” and “Benefitted from a particular 
situation”) appear at a much lower rate, with the first one occurring 26 times and the second 
one a sparse 6 times. These codes elucidate how Indigenous Peoples cope and successfully 
manage these systemic disadvantages (Articles 1 and 7), how Indigenous resistance and 
insurgency has contributed to an improved situation (Articles 3 and 11), and how the MAS’ 
policies and Evo Morales have facilitated political and social emancipation (Articles 4, 9, 10, 
and 11). 
8.1.7 Conclusion 
Most articles emphasised either the qualities of Indigenous Peoples, their (political) agency and 
their ability to resist and fight back, using Indigenous heroes from the past and the present as 
examples to follow and inspirational figures, while at the same equating the non-Indigenous 
Bolivians with Spanish colonialism, stoking and inflaming conflicts along ethnic divides. As 
evidenced by the most commonly occurring frames mentioned above, the majority of the 
articles highlighted the injustices borne by Indigenous Peoples during both the colonial and the 
republican eras, the chronic disadvantages and endemic shortages they still endure today, and 
the ways in which their own political agency can dilute those differences. Through constant 
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evoking of Indigenous Peoples’ cultural, ontological and epistemological purity, Cambio set 
the discourse along the lines of ethnic differences between Indigenous Bolivians and the so 
called criollo portion of society. The recurrent usage of these methods can be better understood 
by taking into account the State’s discourse regarding ethnicity and its political relevance, 
which tries to deconstruct “racism and racist economic structures” (Postero 2013: 108) through 
the emancipation of Indigenous Peoples in regards to criollos. It is not only a social justice 
project but it is also a political promise, and Cambio blends both to further the government’s 
own political agenda, program and survival. 
8.2 El Deber 
A grand total of 20 articles were analysed for El Deber, as there was a bigger pool to select 
from in regards to Indigenous Peoples. Unlike the other newspapers, every article retrieved 
from El Deber was from a single year; in this case, 2018. In total, there were 265 coded 
occurrences, split fairly evenly between the frames, with the (De) Colonisation Frame being 
an exception. The most common frames were the Identity Frame and the Responsibility 
Frame, with 64 and 56 codes occurrences, amounting to 24,2% and 21,1%, respectively, of the 
totality of the frames. The third most commonly occurring frame was the Credibility Frame, 
which appeared 17% of the time, coded 45 times, making El Deber the newspaper in which this 
frame was most present. The Conflict Frame followed closely, appearing 16,6% of the time, 
with 44 occurrences. In contrast, the (Political) Agency Frame and the (De) Colonisation 
Frame appeared only 13,6% (36 out of 265) and 7,5% (20 out of 265) of the time, respectively, 
making them the two least occurring frames. The latter frame in El Deber was represented at 
its lowest percentage when compared with the occurrence of the same frame in all other 
publications. 
Much like most of the newspapers analysed, the difference between the prevalence of negative 
and positive codes was not drastic enough to warrant any conclusions; out of the ten most 
commonly occurring codes, six were negative, including the three most common (“Affected 
by a particular situation”, “Mutual reproaching” and “Negative confrontations”, with 22, 
19, and 17 occurrences, respectively), and out of the ten least occurring codes, five were 
negative and five were positive, with the least occurring codes being, with only one occurrence 
each, “Colonial time positively” and “Colonial time negatively”, another sign of the relative 
little relevance of the (De) Colonisation Frame. However, the total number of positive and 
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negative coded instances revealed El Deber to be slightly more prone to employ negative 
framing, with a total of 149 negatively coded instances, compared to a lower total of 116 
positively coded occurrences. 
8.2.1 Conflict Frame 
The negative codes in the Conflict Frame (“Negative confrontations” and “Mutual 
reproaching”) were particularly present in El Deber. The former was present 17 times, whereas 
the latter occurred in 19 occasions, making them the third and second most common individual 
codes in this newspaper’s analysis, behind only the code “Affected by a particular situation”, 
from the Responsibility Frame. The first one of these codes appeared in eight different articles, 
with the bulk of it being present in four different articles. Articles 5, 11, 14, and 20 each had 
three coded instances with this code, with article 3 being the only other article with more than 
one occurrence, with two. 
The “Negative confrontations” described in these articles account for clashes between 
Indigenous Peoples and Evo Morales’ State, either by highlighting Indigenous Peoples’ 
resistance nationally (Article 3) or by their pleads in international fora against the MAS 
government, denouncing the breach of Indigenous rights and demanding their upkeeping by the 
government (Article 5). The code is featured heavily in discrediting Morales’ political project, 
either by declaring it too pro-Indigenous and partisan to an ethnic group/stratum of society 
(Articles 14 and 15) or by highlighting the still existing inequalities and shortcomings that the 
MAS government hasn’t tackled or solved properly (Article 20). The second of these codes 
(“Mutual reproaching”), perhaps unsurprisingly, overlaps to some degree with the previous 
one. It is present in half of the articles analysed, with articles 3, 11, 14, 15, and 20 containing 
4, 2, 3, 2, and 3 occurrences of the code, respectively, totalling 14 of the 19 times the code was 
found. The overall tone is similar to the one from the first negative code of this frame, with the 
parties involved in conflict being only Indigenous Peoples and the State, always personified by 
either Evo Morales or his righthand man and vice-president Álvaro García Linera. 
The positive codes, much like in the other newspapers (with the exception of La Razón), appear 
in much lower numbers and concentrated. The first of these codes (“Positive agreements”) 
appears only five times, with article 2 containing four of such instances, all related to the way 
in which Indigenous Peoples manage to live in accordance with and without disturbance of their 
natural environment and how much one can learn from them, in a characteristic depiction of 
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Indigenous Peoples along the lines of what Lucero described as Indigenous purity and 
authenticity (2008). The second one (“Peaceful coexistence”), appears a scant three times, 
again highlighting the symbiotic existence of Indigenous Peoples with nature, not with other 
sections of Bolivian society. 
In general, this frame is quite heavily slanted towards the negative, with Indigenous Peoples’ 
plights being almost exclusively highlighted when, and only when, pitted against the present 
government, personified by Evo Morales, whose Indigenous background serves as fuel for 
mostly imbalanced political attacks. The only positive mentions of Indigenous groups are in 
regards to their symbiotic and environmentally sound lifestyles, perpetuating stereotypes of the 
pure, static and hermetic forest-dwelling Indian. 
8.2.2 Credibility Frame  
This frame was quite present in the articles analysed form El Deber, much more so than in any 
other newspaper. The codes were almost evenly split between negative and positive ones, with 
the former occurring 23 times while the latter appeared in 22 instances. However, the virtual 
equal of occurrences tell only half of the story, as the negative codes where widespread, 
appearing in eight articles, whereas the positive ones were heavily concentrated and only 
present in four, with one article (Article 2) containing 19 of the 22 positive code occurrences 
of this frame. 
The negative codes (“Concern about Indigenous Peoples’ ability to handle situations” and 
“Indigenous Peoples acting worse than expected”) appeared 12 and 11 times, and appeared 
in seven and eight distinct articles, respectively. Much like with the other codes, the overlapping 
was noticeable, as only one article (Article 1) did not overlap, as it appears exclusively in the 
code “Indigenous Peoples acting worse than expected”. All the other instances overlap, with 
articles 15, 16 and 20 being the most represented.  
In relation to the first code, article 20 contains four instances in which it is present. It highlights 
the difficulties Indigenous Peoples still encounter when accessing services in their native 
tongues, but mostly tries to delegitimise Evo Morales’ credibility as an Indigenous person, 
claiming that, much like much of the State’s institutions which still fail to adequately provide 
services in Indigenous languages, Morales’ ability to speak Aymara should very much be in 
doubt, and, therefore, is real “Indianness”. Articles 15 and 16 each contain two occurrences of 
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this code, with the first one being especially critical of the new politicised Indigenous 
movement and of Evo Morales’ participation in it, in which the latter is accused of using the 
former for political gain, as well as downplaying the role Morales’ government has had when 
it comes to improving conditions, both legally and socio-economically, for Indigenous Peoples. 
Much like the articles containing the majority of the coded instances of the previous code 
(“Concern about Indigenous Peoples ability to handle situations”), those in which this code 
occurs paint a similar picture; Evo Morales is only the Indigenous President by the mandate 
given to him by Indigenous Peoples, not by his self-identification16, which El Deber 
systematically denies him. 
The second negative code (“Indigenous Peoples acting worse than expected”) appears eleven 
times, with most of the same articles (Articles 15 and 16) being the most representative. The 
former contained three occurrences of this code, while the latter comprised two. This code again 
seems to be personified by Evo Morales’ shortcomings, with article 15, again, claiming that he, 
and by extension Indigenous Peoples, have misbehaved by squandering the economic bonanza 
created during the last decade, with no real change to the reality of Bolivia’s Indigenous, with 
only (personal) political gain as the overarching and guiding goal. Article 16 follows the same 
line of thinking, highlighting how the MAS government uses the Indigenous image to “get away 
with things” and sliding by, since refusing, opposing or denying Morales is deemed racist on 
the count of him being an Indigenous Aymara. 
Contrastingly, more so than in any other newspapers, the positive codes of the Credibility 
Frame appear in lower number than their negative counterparts, even without accounting for 
the caveat of 19 of the 22 occurrences stemming from a single article, something unique in all 
the four publications analysed. The positive codes (“Indigenous Peoples’ ability to handle 
situations” and “Indigenous Peoples acting evenly/better than expected”) both appear 
eleven times, with the former found in four articles and the latter in only one, article 2. Articles 
4, 12, and 18 each contain one coded occurrence, with the remaining nineteen occurring in the 
aforementioned article 2. In contrast with how Indigenous Peoples are represented when they 
are in position of political power and/or agency, Indigenous Peoples here (Article 2), portrayed 
as “keepers of their sacred home”, deep in the Amazon, are depicted positively. Their 
knowledge and symbiotic living with the forest, their action and fundamental role in the 
 
16 In article 15, in the original, “Es el encargo que le dio la población junto con el cheque en blanco de los votos. 
Lo hicieron el presidente indígena, cuando en realidad es presidente cocalero. Evo acepta el encargo-regalo y a 
los indígenas los hace su bandera”. 
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preservation of Nature are highlighted and highly touted, with constant reminders of the need 
to preserve their traditional ways of living and of preventing and mitigating climate change, 
which affects Indigenous communities first and foremost. 
This representation of Indigenous Peoples falls in line with what Lucero called the “realness” 
of “Indians” and how it has been represented as frozen in time and with little to no agency, as 
mentioned before. Indigenous Peoples from the highlands have been often seen and cast, like 
in this case, as “less “pure” and “authentic” than their Amazonian counterparts” (Lucero 2008: 
35), as previously discussed, as they have attempted to diffuse the Western-imposed views on 
what Indigenous means by engaging in politics and re-appropriating discourses and practices. 
Lowland Indigenous Groups, however, are showcased as what a “real” Indian should be and 
what they are allowed to be by extraneous identity-setting voices, which laud their “authentic” 
and “original” ways, as long as they don’t go much astray and decide to participate in what has 
been historically reserved for the non-Indigenous Bolivians. 
8.2.3 (Political) Agency Frame 
The (Political) Agency Frame is the second least common frame in El Deber, representing 
slightly less than 14% of the total frames encountered, having been coded only 36 times. Its 
negative codes (“Indigenous Peoples’ political agency negatively” and “Indigenous 
Peoples’ lack of resources to achieve”) appear only five and ten times, respectively. Two 
different articles contain most of the occurrences for each code; whereas article 15 contains 
three of the five coded instances of the first negative code, article 20 contains six of the ten 
occurrences of the second negative code of this frame. 
The first code reads similarly to the negative codes in the previous frame, the Credibility 
Frame, as the Indigenous Peoples’ agency portrayed as negative is again Evo Morales’, with 
his proceso de cambio roundly mocked and ridiculed, with the changes enacted (for they too 
can be seen) as always being sold short of actually achieving and representing real change. The 
same difficult process of separating Evo Morales, the political figure, from Evo Morales, the 
Indigenous person, is encountered here, as the politically slanted and polarised discourse makes 
it hard to unravel if the purposely negative representation is overtly aimed at the politician or 
covertly directed at the Indigenous person, and by extension, to other Indigenous Peoples. The 
second code follows a similar path, being coded when discrediting Evo Morales and, again, 
delegitimising his “indigeneity”, though it also appears when dealing with the still real 
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shortages Indigenous Peoples encounter. These difficulties, however, are always used to point 
out the failures of Morales’ government and his policies, much like the rest of the politicised 
representation of Indigenous Peoples throughout El Deber, not the historical conditions which 
led to this imbalance. 
On the other hand, the positive codes of this frame (“Indigenous Peoples’ political agency 
positively” and “Indigenous Peoples’ abundance of resources to achieve”), appear in more 
contrasting numbers between themselves. The former appears 17 times, being the third most 
common individual code, whereas the latter appears only 4 times, corroborating the data from 
the remaining publications, in which this code (“Indigenous Peoples’ abundance of resources 
to achieve”) appears only marginally, and always in significantly lower numbers than any other 
code in this frame, reflecting the lack of social, economic and political capital amassed 
historically by Indigenous Peoples. 
Much like in many other codes, article 2 is the one which contains the highest concentration of 
codes which relate to a “positive” representation of Indigenous Peoples. Seven of the seventeen 
occurrences of the code Indigenous Peoples’ political agency positively appear in article 2, 
with the rest of the appearances being scattered marginally across seven other articles. Much 
like before, it is the knowledge of Indigenous Peoples of the Amazon Basin which is highlighted 
and deemed important, with the coded instances overlapping with the ones previously 
mentioned in the Credibility Frame, perpetuating a Western-imposed view of what is “good” 
or “positive” when it comes to Indigenous Peoples, a necessarily polar “other” denied the same 
agency and participation granted to non-Indigenous Bolivians. The second of these positive 
codes appears only in four distinct articles, with each containing one occurrence. Article 6 talks 
about the support of international legal mechanisms in upholding Indigenous rights, whereas 
the rest of the articles (9, 18, and 20) also talk about the legal protections afforded to Indigenous 
Peoples by the Bolivian constitution, even if this is followed in these last three articles by an 
attack on the State and its definitely spotty record when it comes to abiding by this foundational 
document, with the TIPNIS confrontation as the prime example. 
8.2.4 Identity Frame 
The Identity Frame is the most common frame encountered in El Deber, accounting for more 
than 24% of all frames, having been coded a total of 64 times. Its negative codes (“Indigenous 
Peoples’ identity negatively”, “Denying Indigenous Peoples’ identity markers”, “Pre-
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Columbian identity negatively” and “Indigenous identity opposed to Criollo/Western”) 
account for 25 of the 64 total coded instances, with 3, 8, 3, and 11 occurrences per code, 
respectively. 
The first of these codes appears once in articles 16, 19 and 20; the first example blatantly attacks 
Indigenous diplomats or envoys, delegitimising their “indigeneity” by accusing them of being 
“disguised” as Indigenous, whereas the second criticises the political usage of the Indígena 
Originario Campesino as the example around which the State must devise public policies, and 
the third highlights the difficulties encountered by Indigenous People when accessing public 
services even when legal protections are in place for no discrimination to occur. The second 
code (“Denying Indigenous Peoples’ identity markers”) appears in five different articles, but 
article 20 contains almost half of its 8 occurrences. In this article, much like before, it is Evo 
Morales’ “indigeneity” being questioned, as well as his State’s employees, who still 
discriminate Indigenous Peoples based on their mother tongue or their garments. The third code 
(“Pre-Columbian identity negatively”) appears only three times, with article 1 containing two 
of these instances. It is used to criticise the oft-employed discourse of Indigenous purity, which 
the government and Morales use time after time, as it denies the possibility of returning to a 
certain “pure” point in the past and a restart thenceforth, highlighting the highly syncretic nature 
of many aspects of identity in Bolivia, from the violin playing Chiquitos from the Eastern 
lowlands to the massive Oruro Carnival. This attempt to highlight mestizaje follows a similar 
path to the aforementioned sanitising of the Oruro Carnival and the removal of subjectively 
active Indigenous Peoples from it, as explained by Oviedo (2014). The final code of this frame 
(“Indigenous identity opposed to Criollo/Western”) is the most common of the negative 
codes, appearing 11 times. It appears in eight different articles, with articles 4 and 20 having 
the most occurrences, with two and three, respectively. The first of these two articles highlights 
the Evo Morales’ speech at the United Nations, in which the president resorts to the same binary 
oppositions which permeated the articles in Cambio, urging Indigenous Peoples to identify 
“internal and external enemies to liberate [Indigenous] Peoples”17, whereas the second of these 
two articles talks about how certain Indigenous Peoples use this same dualistic terminology, 
how this notion is pervasive throughout Bolivia, and how this is behind discrimination and how 
the State maintains its position to legally protect Indigenous Peoples from this kind of struggle 
and prejudice. 
 
17 In the original, “es necesario identificar a los enemigos internos y externos para liberar a los pueblos” 
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The positive codes of this frame, on the other hand (“Indigenous Peoples’ identity positively”, 
“Ascribing/relaying Indigenous Peoples’ identity markers”, “Pre-Columbian identity 
positively” and “Indigenous identity equated/related to Criollo/Western”), represent 39 of 
the 64 coded cases, divided in 14, 11, 6, and 8 coded occurrences, respectively. The first of 
these codes sees eight of its fourteen occurrences condensed in article 2, which contains more 
than half of these incidences, as it appears in only three other articles (Articles 4, 17, and 20). 
Article 17 is the only instance in which Indigenous Peoples’ identity is not entirely confined to 
the aforementioned Western-imposed view supported by Lucero’s work (although it still 
portrays Indigenous Peoples as mystical and metaphysical and under a similar light as article 
2), as the piece highlights the existence and importance of Indigenous poetry. Article 20 
mentions how positively the State sees Indigenous identity and how it is educating its own 
employees to better serve the Indigenous population without discrimination, prejudice, or the 
need for help from those versed in the until now non-Indigenous apparatus of the state. The 
second positive code of this frame (“Ascribing/relaying Indigenous Peoples’ identity 
markers”) appears eleven times, with articles 2 and 17, with three occurrences each, 
accounting for more than half of them. These overlap with the previous code, as the coded 
instances are much of the same, again representing Indigenous Peoples as forest communities 
which preserve and live in harmony with Nature, which is present in and a fundamental part of 
their ontology and artistic expressions. The next positive code, “Pre-Columbian identity 
positively”, appears six times, four of which split evenly in articles 4 and 17. Whereas the latter 
conveys how the overtly racist and colonial perspectives, which understood Indigenous Peoples 
as incapable of producing poetry, are changing towards understanding and appreciation of the 
infinite beauty and diversity of both written and oral tales of all Amerindian cultures, the former 
conveys Evo Morales’ own discourse on how Indigenous Peoples have historically been and 
still are the societal driving force in the Americas and on how they need to fight to reclaim 
political power. The last of the positive codes of this frame, “Indigenous identity 
equated/related to Criollo/Western”, appears heavily concentrated, as article 1 contains 
seven of the eight occurrences registered. In this article, a similar discourse of that employed 
during the post-1952 National Revolution can be seen (Lucero 2008, Oviedo 2014), as the 
experience of one specific group of Indigenous Peoples, the Chiquitanos, is used to dismiss the 
need to balance the power inequality which still exists in Bolivia. In stark opposition to the 
dualistic discourse of Morales and the State (and of Cambio, too), the article opposes the 
dismissal of the Republic era, during which a mestizo Bolivia was (allegedly) built, arguing that 
the Chiquitanos should serve as a model for the country, as one People which has incorporated 
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and accepted “Western” elements while keeping “their own”. It conveys a message of ex aequo 
hybridity and syncretism, which was not the case historically and still isn’t today. It uses the 
syncretic nature of other elements of the national identity of Bolivia, such as the aforementioned 
Oruro Carnival, to stress the mestizo face of the country, going so far as to say that perhaps the 
most important feature of Chiquitano identity is its colonial Jesuit past. 
8.2.5 (De) Colonisation Frame 
The (De) Colonisation Frame in El Deber is the smallest of its type amongst all of the 
newspapers analysed, accounting for just 7% of the totality of frames of this publication, with 
only 20 coded occurrences. Its negative codes (“Decolonisation as negative/difficult”, 
“Decolonisation as illegitimate”, and “Colonial time positively”) accounted for four, seven 
and one occurrences, respectively. As with other codes in El Deber, there is a high 
concentration of the coded occurrences in a small number of articles; in relation to the negative 
codes of this frame, article 1 contains seven of the twelve coded instances, being the one which 
has the most occurrences of each of the three negative codes. 
As it relates to the first code, article 1 highlights that, although bringing the plurality of cultures 
and peoples of Bolivia together has been a tremendous achievement, the discourse of ethnic 
and cultural purity consecrated in the 2009 Constitution has also brought back “an old and 
sterile debate around the antinomy construction-destruction and the Manichean reading of light-
dark and good-bad that intended the disqualification of the whole colonial period (…) and much 
of or the entirety of the Republican period”18. The article, written by the not-entirely-impartial 
former president of Bolivia and Morales’ immediate predecessor, Carlos Mesa, dismisses the 
idea of a non-mestizo nation, highlighting the Chiquitano examples and their syncretic adoption 
of Jesuit-brought traditions and practices, painting a clearly opposing view to the State’s 
proceso de cambio political path, erected on Indigenous precedence and antecedence, both 
temporal and cultural, at the expense of the criollo/mestizo society which has ruled Bolivia 
throughout the Republican era. Article 7 delegitimises Morales’ decolonisation programmes 
and policies as a political tool masqueraded behind the and borne on the back of Indigenous 
Peoples, whereas article 15 does the same, attributing most of the social changes of recent times 
to the policy implemented in the ‘90s, before the MAS government was elected. The second 
 
18 In the original, “reabrió también un viejo y estéril debate en torno a la antinomia construcción-destrucción y a 
la lectura maniquea de claros-oscuros y buenos-malos que pretendía la descalificación de todo el periodo colonial 
y, en esa dinámica, buena parte o todo el periodo republicano.” 
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code overlaps, in regards to article 1 and its four coded instances, with the previously discussed 
code. Article 15 contains three coded occurrences, one of which also overlaps with the previous 
code, with two other paragraphs questioning the legitimacy of decolonisation, going so far as 
to say that “giving some spare change to the poor is not changing their reality”19, hence 
downplaying the results and effects of the so-called process of change. The third and last of the 
negative codes of this frame appears only once, in article 1, reinforcing the good things that 
have stemmed from the European arrival to what is now Bolivia and how that has led to what 
is termed a “plural wealth” of cultures and practices. 
The positive codes of the frame (“Decolonisation as positive/possible”, “Decolonisation as 
legitimate”, and “Colonial time negatively”) appear in lesser numbers than their negative 
equivalents, with three, four, and one occurrence, respectively. In similar fashion, the code 
concentration is high, with article 18 comprising of five of the eight total coded positive 
occurrences in this frame. This article, which contains most of the positive codes of this frame, 
most of them overlapping, highlights the actual positive changes enacted by the MAS 
government towards achieving  a more equitable and fairer Bolivia, stressing the societal 
features which were (and to some extent still are) based on the discrimination and repression of 
Indigenous Peoples, legitimizing the need to enact this process of change and decolonisation. 
The article expounds how this proceso de cambio can be a blueprint for a plurinational state by 
highlighting the partnership between Evo Morales, an Indigenous Aymara President, and 
Álvaro García Linera, his criollo vice-president, bridging differences beyond race and ethnicity, 
building a nation that works fairly for all Bolivians. 
8.2.6 Responsibility Frame  
The Credibility Frame is the second biggest in El Deber, representing 21% of the totality of 
frames, with 56 coded instances. It is the most widespread of the frames encountered in the 
newspaper, with its codes appearing in 15 of the 20 articles analysed, with the negative codes 
alone being present in 14 of them. It also contains the single most occurring individual code, 
“Affected by a particular situation”, found 22 times. 
Its negative codes are “Responsible for a particular situation” and the aforementioned 
“Affected by a particular situation”, which appear, correspondingly, 16 and 22 times. The 
 
19 In the original, “Dar limosnas a los pobres no es cambiar su realidad”. 
  50 
first of these two codes is found in ten different articles, with articles 3 and 5 being the most 
representative, with three occurrences each. Both of these two articles denounce the actions of 
the MAS government against Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia, namely regarding the TIPNIS 
confrontation. The first of these two, article 3, is especially harsh and blames the government 
and the social movements which have ascended to politically relevant and prominent roles for 
having succumbed to corruption and turned their back on Indigenous Peoples when their 
political agendas and Indigenous Peoples’ rights didn’t match. The government’s discourse and 
its actions are also criticised, as they seem to be paradoxically opposed, in articles 6, 7, or 13. 
The second code, “Affected by a particular situation”, is both widespread and at the same 
time heavily concentrated. It appears in ten different articles (the majority of which is the same 
as the previous code), but only three of them have more than one coded occurrence, with article 
20 having almost half of them, with ten such incidences. All of these occurrences relate to 
Indigenous Peoples being affected negatively by a certain situation, with Evo Morales and his 
government being the culprits in almost every situation, as Indigenous Peoples have suffered 
from the TIPNIS confrontation with the government (Articles 3, 5, and 6) and the executive is 
also responsible for still having not solved the profound historical inequalities in the country 
(Articles 7 and 20), although the reasons and culprits of those same inequalities are not brought 
into the discussions. In short, the negative codes of this frame almost exclusively lay the blame 
for unfair or unequal situations at the feet of Evo Morales and his government, pinpointing their 
shortcomings, while always portraying Indigenous Peoples as those most (negatively) affected 
by governmental decisions and policies. 
The positive codes of this frame, on the other hand, appear in smaller quantities. The code 
“Solved a particular situation” appears 12 times and the code “Benefitted from a particular 
situation” was found only a scant 6 times, the lowest number of any code in this frame. The 
first of these codes is also heavily concentrated, with nine of the twelve occurrences stemming 
from article 2. In this article, Indigenous Peoples are credited as preserving the environmental 
balance of the ecosystem, as well as being responsible for halting habitat loss and deforestation 
in the Bolivian Amazon. It provides examples of how Indigenous Peoples successfully manage 
resources and are forefront protectors and fighters against environmental degradation and 
towards curbing climate change, while at the same time, through this responsible management 
of their own living environment, fostering their own cultural group and preserving their identity 
and cultural practices. Article 11 talks briefly about how millions of Bolivians have been lifted 
out of poverty during Morales’ stay in power, and how the government congratulates itself 
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about that and many other achievements, only to revert immediately to a critical stance towards 
the MAS and accusing it of not tending to the totality of the population and being overtly and 
discriminatorily pro-Indigenous. 
The second and last code, “Benefitted from a particular situation”, appears six times and his 
present in four articles, with articles 11 and 20 having two coded instances each. The instances 
coded in article 11 overlap with those from the previous code, whereas those found in article 
20 are testimonies from government officials claiming that the laws in place already help fight 
discrimination and empower Indigenous Peoples, albeit also disputed and rebuked immediately 
in their aftermath. 
8.2.7 Conclusion 
Even though this is not an idiosyncrasy exclusive to El Deber, it is particularly hard in articles 
from this publication to disentangle Evo Morales, the president, from Evo Morales, the 
Indigenous man, as it is his individual shortcomings, over-emphasised for political reasons, 
which seem to shape the discourse on Indigenous Peoples in El Deber. In the other situations 
in which Indigenous Peoples are even mentioned, it is almost always for politicised purposes 
which seem to be aimed at delegitimising whatever policy, decision or stance taken by the MAS 
government. In many ways, Indigenous Peoples seem to be only of concern when they can 
either be represented as “pure” forest dwellers or as disadvantaged citizens which bring to light 
the political failures and shortcomings of Morales’ proceso de cambio, and seldom the 
structural and long-term disadvantages Indigenous Peoples faced in the political structure and 
landscape that preceded it. 
In general, there is a constant delegitimisation of Indigenous Peoples ability and agency, 
through carefully constructed though indirect attacks, aimed not at Indigenous Peoples at large 
but to the one which symbolises in Bolivia, at least discursively, the rest of Indigenous Peoples; 
Evo Morales, constantly accused of not being Indigenous, of being biased, partisan, corrupt, 
dismantling the social order to accommodate demands from Indigenous Peoples (and therefore 
“unfair” to the criollo and white sections of the nation), who up until now on the proverbial 
“short end of the proverbial stick”. Discrediting Evo Morales, politically and personally, seems 
to be the least obviously and openly conflictive way of resisting the power balance shift without 
being demonstratively against Indigenous Peoples and their ex aequo right to full citizenship, 
education, civil participation, and so many other aspects of life in plurinational Bolivia, whose 
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movement towards an equal society puts those previously privileged at risk from losing those 
same perks so keenly denied to Indigenous Peoples. 
8.3 La Razón 
La Razón was the newspaper with the least number of articles chosen, as only 12 were selected. 
This was due to the lack of relevant publications specifically dealing with Indigenous Peoples 
or Indigenous issues. The majority of the articles chosen were from 2016, as there were nine 
from this year, with 2017, with two, and 2018, with one, comprising the remaining articles. In 
part due to the smaller numbers of articles analysed, La Razón had the least number of coded 
occurrences, with only 223. The two most present frames were the (Political) Agency Frame 
and the (De) Colonisation Frame, with 23,3% and 22% of the totality of frames, respectively, 
with the former accounting for 52 coded instances and the latter for 49. Immediately following 
these two frames was the Identity Frame, with 21,5% of the total, with 48 coded examples. 
After that, the Responsibility Frame appears at the lower rate of 15,2%, with 34 coded 
instances, before there is a noticeable gap between it and the two least occurring frames, the 
Credibility and the Conflict frames. These last two frames both appear below the 10% 
threshold, present, respectively, in 9,9% and in 8,1% of the totality of the frames, with the 
former having been coded 22 times and the latter in only 18 occasions. 
Overall, there was a clear two-fold division between frames, with the (Political) Agency, the 
(De) Colonisation, and the Identity frames representing almost two thirds of all the frames, 
with the remaining three frames (Responsibility, Credibility, and Conflict) comprising the 
other third. In a slight divergence from the other publications, the most and least commonly 
occurring codes were quite contrasting; only two of the ten most common individual were 
negative, whereas on the other end of the spectrum eight of the bottom ten were negative. The 
coded occurrences are heavily concentrated in a handful of individual codes, with four codes 
comprising almost half (105 out of 223) of all the coded instances (code 10 – Indigenous 
Peoples’ political agency positively (31), code 22 – Decolonisation as positive/possible (30), 
code 14 – Indigenous Peoples’ identity positively (23), and code 29 – Affected by a 
particular situation (21)), though each code belongs to a distinct frame. 
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8.3.1 Conflict Frame 
The Conflict Frame in La Razón is the smallest of all the Conflict frames analysed, both in 
total number of occurrences (with only 18, an even more contrasting number when compared 
with the second least coded newspaper in relation to this frame, El Deber, with 44 such 
instances) and in percentual value within a specific newspaper, amounting to only 8% of the 
frames in this publication. 
The negative codes in this frame (“Negative confrontations”, and “Mutual reproaching”) 
appear only two and six times, respectively. The first of these two codes appears in only one 
article (Article 10), highlighting the conflicts (with physical violence, in this case) between 
Indigenous organisations which have not aligned with Evo Morales’ programme and the MAS 
government, with the portrayed Indigenous person having been victim of assault by an 
organization affiliated with the State due to its political positionings. The second of the negative 
codes of this frame appears in three different articles; in addition to the aforementioned article 
10, articles 1 and 2 contain two and three coded instances of this code, respectively. Article 1 
discusses the conflicts between Indigenous justice and ordinary justice, with government 
officials claiming the latter could learn from the former, which is “in good health” and functions 
properly, unlike its counterpart. Article 2, on the other hand, discusses how Indigenous Peoples 
and their civil associations have to battle against the misuse of traditional garments and symbols 
by others, which have used Indigenous clothes to their own benefit without consulting and 
obtaining approval from the communities from which they stem. 
The positive codes in this frame (“Positive agreements” and “Peaceful coexistence”) are 
slightly more numerous than their negative equivalents, but only marginally, each with five 
occurrences. All of the coded instances for these two codes overlap entirely, with three such 
occurrences in article 12, and one apiece for articles 4 and 6. These positive codes appear in 
articles dealing with Indigenous autonomies, emphasising and highlighting the very real 
possibility of a peacefully coexisting plurinational Bolivia, with Indigenous-managed territories 
existing side by side with the rest of the nation, aptly applying their own political, social and 
judicial laws within their communities. 
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8.3.2 Credibility Frame  
The Credibility Frame is, after the previously analysed Conflict Frame, the second least 
represented frame in La Razón, constituting just 9,9% of all the frames in this newspaper. It is 
overwhelmingly positive, with the negative codes accounting for only 4 coded instances, as 
opposed to 18 positive ones. 
The negative codes (“Concern about Indigenous Peoples’ ability to handle situations” and 
“Indigenous Peoples acting worse than expected”) are, as mentioned, quite rare, with the 
former appearing only once and the latter only thrice, in articles 11 and 2, respectively. Albeit 
coded negatively, these articles talk about how Indigenous Peoples still encounter systemic 
problems and the ways in which they try to cope with them (article 11) and how certain 
Indigenous Peoples themselves misuse and appropriate Indigenous symbols and clothing for 
their own benefit, breaking the norm of needing permission from the communities to wear them 
(article 2). 
The positive codes (“Indigenous Peoples’ ability to handle situations” and “Indigenous 
Peoples acting evenly/better than expected”), on the other hand, appear much more often, 
though still with a certain degree of concentration. The first of these two codes appears ten 
times (in four different articles), while the second appears eight times (in two distinct pieces). 
As it relates to the code “Indigenous Peoples’ ability to handle situations”, the articles stress 
the success of Indigenous justice (Article 1), and how the processes to achieve Indigenous 
autonomies have been set in motion, as well as how they can be great examples of 
communitarian and civil participation (Articles 6, 7, and 12). The second code overlaps with 
the first one, with almost the same number of coded instances in the same articles. Whereas 
article 6 and 7 are not present, article 1 was coded twice and article 12 appeared six times, 
overlapping with the coded instances of the previous code. 
8.3.3 (Political) Agency Frame 
The (Political) Agency Frame is the largest individual frame in La Razón, comprising 23,3% 
of the total of frames. This frame in this particular newspaper is also the biggest (Political) 
Agency Frame of all the publications, but only in proportion and not in total number of coded 
occurrences, as only El Deber has a lower total in absolute numbers. 
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The negative codes (“Indigenous Peoples’ political agency negatively” and “Indigenous 
Peoples’ lack of resources to achieve”) appear in very divergent proportions, with the former 
appearing only once and the latter being found fifteen times, making it the fifth largest of all 
the individual codes in La Razón. This disparity is found in all other newspapers, with the first 
code being always less represented than the second. However, the code “Indigenous Peoples’ 
lack of resources to achieve” is uncharacteristically concentrated, appearing in only two 
articles, articles 3 and 11, in sharp contrast with the other newspapers, in which the code 
appeared more widely spread and distributed in between a handful of articles and with less 
concentration. Article 3 talks about the long and arduous road towards achieving Indigenous 
autonomy, while article 11, which contains 13 of the 15 coded instances, places a heavy 
emphasis on the dire situations faced by Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia, how extreme poverty 
is still rampant and it still forces many Indigenous persons to flock to the bigger cities during 
certain seasons, in particular the holidays, to try to sell their products and beg for money in 
order to make ends meet and survive. 
The positive codes (“Indigenous Peoples’ political agency positively” and “Indigenous 
Peoples’ abundance of resources to achieve”) are also rather uneven between the two of them, 
with the former appearing 31 times, making it the most commonly found individual code in La 
Razón, and the latter being found only five times. The code “Indigenous Peoples’ political 
agency positively” is not only the most commonly occurring code but also the most 
widespread, being present in nine of the twelve articles analysed. It is found in articles 
emphasising Indigenous autonomies (Articles 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 12), stressing how important 
these processes are in achieving decolonisation and self-governance, not just within Bolivia but 
also as examples to be followed all over the world, and in articles concerned with the need to 
create spaces in which Indigenous ideas and conceptions are taken into account, not just “taking 
them out of poverty” but doing so, if desired, by respecting their formulations about what 
amounts to quality of life and living well (Articles 9 and 10). Article 12 is particularly relevant, 
because it contains the most coded occurrences of this code, with seven, but also because it 
conveys a message about the different particularities and specificities of distinct Indigenous 
groups by enumerating the diverse ways in which these groups have gone about the process of 
Indigenous autonomy. The second one of these codes appears only five times and only in article 
9, which emphasises the need to incorporate Indigenous ideas into solving problems which 
chronically and disproportionately affect Indigenous Peoples not just in Bolivia but in Latin 
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America as a whole, while at the same time highlighting the tremendous advances and policies 
which have been enacted to this effect. 
In sum, this frame is quite positive in their representation of Indigenous Peoples, underlining 
the progress done to improve Indigenous Peoples’ lives and in guaranteeing their rights, their 
fundamental role in advancing and implementing policies which ameliorate their situations, 
with only one overwhelmingly negative article present (Article 11), although with a positive 
caveat. 
8.3.4 Identity Frame 
The Identity Frame in this newspaper is the smallest of those of its kind in comparison with 
the other publications. It appears only 21,5% of the time, with 48 coded instances, with an 
overwhelmingly more frequent presence of positive codes. 
The negative codes (“Indigenous Peoples’ identity negatively”, “Denying Indigenous 
Peoples’ identity markers”, “Pre-Columbian identity negatively” and “Indigenous 
identity opposed to Criollo/Western”) appear only 2 times in total, with the first and the last 
of the aforementioned codes having one coded instance each, in articles 10 and 1, respectively. 
The codes “Denying Indigenous Peoples’ identity markers” and “Pre-Columbian identity 
negatively” were not coded a single time. 
The positive codes (“Indigenous Peoples’ identity positively”, “Ascribing/relaying 
Indigenous Peoples’ identity markers”, “Pre-Columbian identity positively” and 
“Indigenous identity equated/related to Criollo/Western”), in complete contrast, appear in 
considerable numbers, with the first three appearing more than ten times each (23, 12, and 10, 
respectively), whereas the last was only coded once. The first of these codes (“Indigenous 
Peoples’ identity positively”) appears 23 times, being the third biggest of the individual codes 
of the entire newspaper. It is found in seven distinct articles, with articles 5 and 12 accounting 
for more than half of these instances, with six and seven coded instances each, correspondingly. 
Article 5 details Indigenous practices, such as that of offering a tribute to Pachamama (Mother 
Earth), and how the ubiquitous practice of reciprocity is part of the identity and the nexus of 
Andean Indigenous Peoples and their environment, whereas article 12 describes the many 
innovations created and incorporated by Indigenous Peoples in drafting and conducting their 
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autonomic processes, which take different shape according to the different Indigenous groups 
which negotiate and participate in them, moulded by the groups’ respective ideas and notions. 
The second of these codes (“Ascribing/relaying Indigenous Peoples’ identity markers”) 
appears in more moderate numbers, though it was still coded a dozen times, appearing in four 
different articles. Once again, articles 5 and 12, with overlapping instances from the previous 
code, convey the identity markers which are relevant to certain Indigenous groups and in 
accordance to certain situations, from the choice of their own Indigenous autonomy name and 
designation to ritualised practices and the incorporation of certain individuals in the group 
performing their respective roles. 
The third code (“Pre-Columbian identity positively”) was coded ten times, a stark difference 
from its negative counterpart (“Pre-Columbian identity negatively”), which was not present 
at all. It appears in four articles, once more with number 5 representing a sizeable part of the 
coded instances, with five such occurrences, highlighting the ancestral nature of the practiced 
rituals and the need for “liberation and decolonisation”. The remaining articles (Articles 1, 6, 
and 7) allude to similar factors, using temporality to legitimise their identity. 
The last of the positive codes of this frame (“Indigenous identity equated/related to 
Criollo/Western”) appears a single time, in article 1, mentioning the fact that Indigenous 
justice enjoys the same legal status as ordinary justice, as parallel yet not subordinate forms of 
socio-judicial resolutions. 
8.3.5 (De) Colonisation Frame 
The (De) Colonisation Frame is the second most common frame in La Razón, ever-so-slightly 
more present than the previous frame, with its 49 coded instances representing 22% of the total 
frames found. Once again, the negatively coded cases represent a much lower percentage of the 
total coded occasions than the positively coded ones, with the former accounting for 8 and the 
latter for 41 of all the coded occurrences. 
The negative codes (“Decolonisation as negative/difficult”, “Decolonisation as 
illegitimate”, and “Colonial time positively”) appear very little, with only the first of these 
three codes actually being present, coded eight times in three different articles. Articles 3, 8 and 
10 have three, three, and two coded instances each, respectively, and their discourse revolves 
not around the negative aspects of working towards decolonisation but rather on the difficulties 
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encountered along the way, in particular as it relates to the Indigenous autonomy processes. 
Article 3 stresses how the process has already entered its third decade, whereas article 8 denotes 
that the procedure is still excessively and extenuatingly bureaucratic. Article 10, on the other 
hand, mentions how political consensus is also hard to achieve in Indigenous communities, as 
the available legal processes towards decolonisation, such as Indigenous autonomy and self-
governance, are put to popular referenda in the communities which they concern and sometimes 
don’t garner enough support to kickstart the process. 
The positive codes (“Decolonisation as positive/possible”, “Decolonisation as legitimate”, 
and “Colonial time negatively”), as mentioned before, are found much more often and present 
in many different articles. The first of these appears 30 times, being the second most commonly 
occurring individual code in the newspaper. Even though it appears in six different articles, it 
is heavily concentrated in articles 7 and 8, as they contain six and twelve code instances, 
respectively. Article 7 outlines the different ways in which Indigenous autonomy can be 
obtained and how other municipalities have started similar self-governance processes, such as 
Raqaypampa (previously featured in one of the articles analysed in Cambio), conveying a 
message of possibility when it comes to trying to achieve decolonisation, whereas article 8 
emphasises how Bolivia’s Indigenous autonomy model is a model to be replicated throughout 
the world, leading the way in the realm of legal autonomies of Indigenous Peoples, anchoring 
its claims in a study conducted in 20 different countries around the globe and analysing the 
level of autonomy of its internal states, autonomic regions, etc. Both articles feature interviews 
with Hugo Siles, former minister of Indigenous autonomies (Ministro de Autonomías), 
promoting a discourse similar to that of the State regarding the decolonisation topic. The 
remaining articles highlight the role of the MAS government in working towards Indigenous 
autonomies (Articles 3 and 5), the importance of the creation of Indigenous self-governments 
in reshaping the fabric of Bolivia as a plurinational state (Article 4), as well as the recovery of 
the status as a nation and as a people for some groups, like the Guaraní (Article 6). 
The second positive code of this frame (“Decolonisation as legitimate”) was coded ten times, 
with articles 3, 5, and 7 containing eight of those instances, with 2, 3, and 3 each, respectively. 
Article 3 legitimises the yearning for decolonisation as a step in “rebuilding the Guaraní nation 
and being free, without being owned”20, at the same time alluding to legislation from the pre-
Morales governments which already conceptualised some legal framework which preceded the 
 
20 In the original, “es solo un paso para reconstituir la Nación Guaraní y vivir libres, sin dueño”. 
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establishment of what are now the territories in the process of achieving Indigenous autonomy. 
Articles 7 and 8, on the other hand, legitimise the decolonisation claims with references to the 
ancestral and pre-Columbian origins of the Indigenous groups in question. 
The last of the positive codes (“Colonial time negatively”) appears only once, in article 7, 
talking about the Indigenous autonomy process of Raqaypampa and highlighting the conditions 
which Indigenous Peoples have had to endure for the last five centuries. When taking into 
account its (absent) negative counterpart, it is evident that there is no emphasis in the profound 
inequalities and injustices of the past, only a positive conveying of the achievements of 
Indigenous emancipation today. 
8.3.6 Responsibility Frame 
The last frame analysed is the third smallest of those found in La Razón, and the second smallest 
of the Responsibility frames in all of the newspapers, with only the one in Página Siete being 
less prevalent. This frame was coded 34 different times, constituting 15,2% of the total frames 
in this publication. The Responsibility Frame was the only frame in which the negatively 
coded occurrences outweighed the positive ones, with 24 of the former and only 10 of the latter. 
Its negative codes (“Responsible for a particular situation” and “Affected by a particular 
situation”) were found in very uneven numbers, with the first of these having been coded only 
3 times and the second one on 21 occasions. The first code appeared only in article 10, mainly 
attributing responsibility to different parties (the army and the Government) in the failure of an 
Indigenous autonomy process in going beyond a popular referendum. The second code, 
however, appeared in six different articles, and was the fourth most found code in all of La 
Razón. Two articles stood out in particular, as articles 9 and 11 contained five and nine instances 
of this code, respectively. Article 9 emphasises the disproportionality of poverty amongst 
Indigenous Peoples in Latin America, with those defined as Indigenous representing only 8% 
of the region’s total population, yet 17% of those living in extreme poverty. At the same time, 
it suggests that such a disparity is still prevalent not due to a lack of action from governments 
in tackling the problem but the manner in which these actions are conducted, as they don’t 
incorporate Indigenous input and knowledge into improving their conditions, and very often 
trample over cultural and identity rights of those which they try to help. Article 11, echoing a 
similar tone, describes the rampant poverty and hardship still endured by Bolivian Indigenous 
Peoples, forced to recur to begging and seasonal migrations to survive, skating by on charity, 
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selling their crafts, playing some Indigenous instruments, some even at a very advanced age, as 
they try to make ends meet for their families, sometimes going to such extremes only to provide 
something as fundamental as basic education or food for their children. In both cases, the lack 
of and disproportionate access to education and the normalisation of this marginalised condition 
(for historical reasons) are some of the explanations brought forth about this topic. 
The positive codes (“Solved a particular situation” and “Benefitted from a particular 
situation”), on the other hand, appear only six and four times, respectively. The first of these 
two positive codes appears in five distinct articles, with only article 8 having more than one 
occurrence, with two. Every one of the articles in which this code was found (Articles 3, 5, 7, 
8, and 12) highlights how the government, by creating a mechanism for Indigenous Peoples to 
achieve self-governance, and these very same processes of Indigenous autonomy, have solved 
some problems and improved the overall situation and living conditions of Indigenous Peoples. 
The second code, appearing in four articles, highlights exactly the same, referring to Indigenous 
Peoples as having benefitted the most from these policies enacted by the government, while at 
the same time stressing their own role in advancing autonomies and transforming those laws 
into effective action and real outcomes. 
8.3.7 Conclusion 
Unlike most of the newspapers analysed, La Razón’s portrayal of Indigenous Peoples seems to 
be overwhelmingly positive, recurring to the positive dimensions of frames more often than 
not. The most common frames are (Political) Agency, (De) Colonisation and Identity (these 
frames also include the three most common individual codes, one each, from most common to 
least, respectively), emphasising the positive nature of the ongoing process of constituting a 
fairer and plurinational Bolivia, with Indigenous Peoples not only accounted for but as integral 
and fundamental parts of the re-founded nation. These three most common frames are almost 
entirely optimistic, with a positive to negative coded instances ratio of almost five to one (123 
to 26), conveying a message of the possibility of achieving a more equitable nation which fully 
incorporates and integrates Indigenous Bolivians into its fabric. 
The most heavily slanted of these frames is the Identity Frame, with 96% of its coded 
occurrences being positive (46 out of 48), followed by the (De) Colonisation Frame, at 84% 
(41 out of 49). However, and comparatively with the only other overwhelmingly positive news 
outlet, Cambio, the frames in La Razón don’t rely on the same dualistic portrayal of Indigenous 
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Peoples versus non-Indigenous, with the two individual codes dealing with that question 
appearing only one time each. Highlighting once again the more amicable approach and 
portrayal of La Razón, the Conflict Frame and the Credibility Frame are not very present, 
with both accounting for less than 10% of the total percentage of frames. One reason for this 
could be the obviously less politicised stance of this newspaper when compared to the State’s 
own publication, which needn’t adhere (editorially at least) to the same criteria of impartiality. 
In sum, La Razón conveys a positive outlook on Indigenous Peoples’ political involvement and 
agency, stressing the immense positive strides achieved towards decolonisation and the full 
integration of Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia, without skipping over the negative side of the 
struggles, bringing to light the problems and inequality still faced and endured by Indigenous 
groups in the country. 
8.4 Página Siete 
Out of the four newspapers analysed, Página Siete was the one from which the highest number 
of articles were retrieved, with 22. This higher number was a product of the wealth of pieces 
related to Indigenous Peoples, both in number, quality and relevance to the topic at hand, though 
this number does not differ much from the average number of articles per newspaper (17,4). 
The 22 articles analysed stemmed from three distinct years, with 2 from 2016, and 10 from 
2017 and 2018 apiece. 
Due to this higher number of analysed texts, Página Siete has the second highest number of 
coded occurrences, with 506, only a shade behind Cambio, which had the most at 509. The 
frame distribution was top-heavy, with the Identity Frame constituting almost a third of all 
frames, at 29,6%, comprising 150 coded instances. This makes this frame the biggest of all the 
frames encountered across all newspapers, both in number of coded occurrences and 
proportionately within a specific publication, with only the same Identity Frame in Cambio 
coming close, with 143 coded occasions and a total of 28,1% of Cambio’s totality of frames. 
This also meant that Página Siete was the only publication without multiple frames accounting 
for more than 20%, as only the Identity Frame was beyond that threshold. 
The second and third most common frames, (Political) Agency Frame and the (De) 
Colonisation Frame, appeared in fairly even numbers and represented 19,4% and 17% of the 
time, coded in 98 and 86 instances, respectively. The fourth most common frame was the 
Conflict Frame, coded 69 times and accounting for 13,6% of the frames found. In contrast 
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with La Razón, this frame was both much more present and much more negative, with 86,9% 
of its coded instances being negative (60 out of 69). The two least common frames were then 
the Credibility Frame and the Responsibility Frame, coded 53 and 50 times, for a total of 
10,5% and 9,9% of all the frames encountered, respectively. Although almost equally rare, 
these two frames were quite distinct in content; whereas the former was the only positively 
coded frame found in Página Siete (32 out of 53), the latter was the most negative of all, with 
44 of its 50 coded occurrences (88% of them) being negative. 
The overall negative tone of the articles analysed was also reflected in the distribution and ratio 
of positive and negative codes amongst the most commonly found individual codes. Out of the 
top ten most recurrent codes, eight were negative, while only three of the ten least frequent 
were equally so. 
8.4.1 Conflict Frame 
The Conflict Frame in Página Siete lands right down the middle when compared to the same 
frame in other publications at 14%, with 8% being the smallest (in La Razón) and 17% being 
the largest (in El Deber). The frame is overwhelmingly negative, as previously mentioned, with 
60 out of 69 coded instances being negative.  
The negative codes in the Conflict Frame, “Negative confrontations”, and “Mutual 
reproaching”, appear 35 and 25 times respectively. The former is tied for the second most 
common individual code in Página Siete and for the second most widespread as well, appearing 
in twelve different articles. In ten of the aforementioned twelve articles, this code is found on 
more than one occasion, painting a widespread picture of conflict. Out of these ten, two articles 
in particular stand out; articles 7 and 21 contain 6 and 4 coded instances of this code, 
respectively. The first of these two texts talks about how there’s a conflictive divide between 
Indigenous and “Whites”, how Indigenous Peoples are attacked and victimised by many non-
Indigenous, whether be it through stereotyping (Indigenous Peoples are often seen as dirty, 
lazy, dishonest), patronising and inferiorising (often called “sons” and “daughters”21,) due to 
fear and scepticism about their abilities and capacities (regarded as thieves and untrustworthy), 
 
21 “Hijos” and “hijas”, in Spanish. This treatment of Indigenous Peoples is similar to those used to undermine 
African Americans in the pre-Civil Rights United States of America (and still afterwards), where and when akin 
terms such as “son” and “boy” were used to delegitimise non-Whites. 
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resorting to insults (such as cholo or t’ara) and derogatory terms (like birlocha22, cunumi 23, 
camba24, colla25, and many others). The second article, on the other hand, expounds on how the 
history of interactions between Indigenous Peoples and non-Indigenous in Bolivia have always 
been divisive and conflictive, something one would expect to have subsided to some extent 
under Evo Morales’ time in office; on the contrary, even though the MAS government has 
managed to incorporate many Indigenous groups into politics and as real parts of the Nation-
State, the divide has grown wider, with polarised conflict between government-backers and 
opposers (often portrayed as a binary - indio/mestizo), along the lines of race and ethnicity. This 
dualistic outlook on politics was clear when analysing the articles from the State’s newspaper, 
Cambio, as political opposition was continuously framed as ethnic opposition, with those which 
challenged Morales, the politician, being touted as anti-Indigenous. 
The second of the negative codes (“Mutual reproaching”) is slightly less common, though 
still relatively widespread, appearing 25 times in 11 different articles. 10 of these articles are 
the same as from the previous code, conveying a message of a continuous clash between 
Indigenous Peoples, or those sympathetic to their causes and rights, and governments and 
companies which breach or don’t uphold said rights, with articles 3 and especially article 13 as 
clear examples of this, the latter of which labels Morales as a “fake Indigenous person”, 
engaging in similar portrayals as that from El Deber, questioning Indigenous self-identification. 
On the other hand, the positive codes of the Conflict frame (“Positive agreements” and 
“Peaceful coexistence”) are much rarer. The first of these codes appears only 4 times in three 
articles, always highlighting how Indigenous Peoples can be important actors in climate change 
mitigation (Article 3), contributing to more social inclusion and support (Article 17), and 
empowering and emancipate Indigenous youth (Article 22). 
The second code appears 5 times in four distinct articles, highlighting the part the much-
embraced syncretism plays in Bolivia and its national identities (Article 8), how people from 
ethnically different backgrounds converge peacefully in their respect for democratic processes 
(Article 19), and how learning, practicing and being capable of engaging in multiple languages 
 
22 A derogatory term used for women, akin to cholo 
23 A term used for Indigenous children, either the offspring of Indigenous servants or Indigenous orphans taken in 
by the house ruler 
24 A term used to designate Indigenous Peoples from the Eastern lowlands 
25 The opposite of camba, used to designate Indigenous Peoples from the Andean highlands 
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can be a useful tool in Plurinational Bolivia, free from the fear and discrimination attached to 
Indigenous languages in the past (Article 22). 
8.4.2 Credibility Frame  
The Credibility Frame is the second smallest of all the frames in Página Siete, and it is also 
the only one coded “positively”; that is, with more occurrences of its positive codes than of its 
negative counterparts. 
Its negative codes (“Concern about Indigenous Peoples’ ability to handle situations” and 
“Indigenous Peoples acting worse than expected”) appear 10 and 11 times respectively, with 
articles 13 and 21 containing seven combined and overlapping occurrences of each code. The 
first of these articles highlights the many corruption cases in which Indigenous persons in 
politically relevant roles have been involved in, such as the Fondo Indígena case, highlighting 
how Morales and his “k’aras” and “fake Indians” have instrumentalised Indigenous Peoples 
for their political gain, using them as tokens and dismantling their effective political agency 
through this manipulation. Much like in El Deber, there is a certain tendency to frame 
Indigenous Peoples as easily manipulated victims, more often than not by Morales and/or his 
cronies, especially when they are somehow MAS sympathisers or supporters. The second 
article, on the other hand, questions the relevancy of guiding the political discourse, led by the 
government, along ethnic lines, as the polarization of Indigenous/non-Indigenous has put the 
Plurinational project at risk, with one such group having replaced another, with no effective 
change in the mechanisms and attitudes employed. Similar to other publications, it is hard to 
disentangle Morales, the politician, from Morales, the Aymara. 
On the other hand, the positive codes of this frame (“Indigenous Peoples’ ability to handle 
situations” and “Indigenous Peoples acting evenly/better than expected”) appear in slightly 
higher numbers, with each of them coded 16 times across five different articles. However, in 
both cases, article 22 accounts for at least half of all the coded occurrences of each code, with 
10 in first and 8 in the second, displaying a similar code concentration as the same frame in El 
Deber, making these codes less widespread and salient. Article 22 speaks extremely positively 
about Indigenous Peoples ability to overcome the difficulty of having to live everyday life while 
using a different language than one’s mother tongue, and how that has inspired a group of 
Aymara people to translate some widely used websites, such as Facebook, into Aymara, 
allowing many to use the platform in their native tongue. The conveyed goal is not for Aymara 
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to be “superior or inferior to Spanish”, but to be equal and treated on even grounds. This article 
and its heavy concentration of positively coded occurrences is the statistical reason for this 
being the only frame coded positively, as the other articles analysed amount to only 6 and 8 
coded instances of the first and second positive codes, respectively. 
Overall, even in this “positive” frame, there is a more widespread concern about Indigenous 
Peoples ability to handle situations, especially in politically relevant roles, as there are constant 
mentions to the corruption cases in Morales’ government; sometimes, though, Indigenous 
Peoples are portrayed as not being guilty of those misdeeds per se, as it is the government (and 
Morales) which leads them to such actions and with whom the blame allegedly lays. 
8.4.3 (Political) Agency Frame 
The (Political) Agency Frame was the second biggest of all the frames in Página Siete, with 
98 coded occurrences, accounting for 19,4% of the totality of frames. Much like the majority 
of the frames in this newspaper, it was quite negative, with instances coded thusly representing 
almost two thirds of the total (64 out of 98). 
The negative codes of this frame (“Indigenous Peoples’ political agency negatively” and 
“Indigenous Peoples’ lack of resources to achieve”) were quite large, with 21 and 43 coded 
instances, particularly the second one, which was the largest individual code in Página Siete 
and the fourth largest in all of the analysed publications. These codes were found in 10 and 11 
different articles, respectively, five of which overlap. The first code only appears more than 
twice in two articles (Articles 7 and 13), with the former containing seven coded paragraphs 
and the latter three. The first of these articles talks extensively about how the notion of 
“Whiteness” was ingrained into the Bolivian national psyche and how that was constructed in 
opposition to the “unfit” and “unsuitable” Indigenous Peoples, not ready for relevant and 
important roles, and how that was and is reflected in access to education and political power, 
still today. The second article, on the other hand, talks about how the government has 
monopolised the Indigeneity discourse, how it has excluded Indigenous Peoples and how it has 
precluded them from enacting real change and accessing power, as it is “controlled” by 
“k’aras”; much like article 7, its negative side is not that Indigenous agency is not good or 
desirable, but rather that it has been stifled and curbed by both the systemic and chronic 
problems mentioned in the previous article and by the current government, which has defused 
it from within, taking control of the discourses on Indigeneity, decolonisation, and many others. 
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The second code, the biggest in Página Siete, is both widespread and concentrated, with article 
7, once more, leading the way, with 18 coded occurrences, followed by articles 13 and 22, each 
with 4. Overall, it appears in eleven different articles. It follows the same pattern as the same 
code in all other newspapers by being much larger than its positive counterpart (“Indigenous 
Peoples’ abundance of resources to achieve”), in this case with a staggering 43 to 1 ratio. 
The articles highlight, again, the challenges and threats Indigenous Peoples face, from being 
imperilled by territory and habitat loss (Articles 1 and 18), a lack of effective political 
participation (Article 5), still having to overcome long-standing inequalities and imbalanced 
structures (Articles 12 and 14), or being misrepresented and used as tokens (Article 13). 
Overall, the articles paint a broadly and widespread dire situation for Indigenous Peoples, as 
there are still profound differences between the planes on which Indigenous Peoples participate 
in everyday life and those which have historically been limited to criollos and whites. 
The positive codes (“Indigenous Peoples’ political agency positively” and “Indigenous 
Peoples’ abundance of resources to achieve”), on the other hand, appear in wildly divergent 
numbers; while the former appears 33 times (making it the 5th biggest individual code in Página 
Siete), the latter appears only once. Much like in all the other previous positive codes, it is 
article 22 which contains the highest number the coded instances, accounting for more than a 
third, with twelve. Articles 10 and 20 contain, correspondingly, 4 and 5 coded occurrences. 
Article 10 describes at length the savvy ways in which Indigenous Peoples, both now and 
throughout the colonial and early republican eras, have engaged, distorted, subverted, and 
adapted foreign traditions as a tactic to reduce their influence, while at the same time allowing 
for the preservation of their own practices and ways, surviving through syncretism and re-
appropriation. This has led to a collage of national celebrations and rites which blend Iberian 
traditions with Indigenous practices, and gives those which re-imagined them a sense of 
belonging and participation previously denied to Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia.  
Article 20 emphasises Indigenous agency from a political point of view instead. It highlights 
how Indigenous Peoples had already blocked the possibility of constitutionalising indefinite re-
elections, which Morales’ was trying to pass through popular referendum (which he lost), as a 
permanent and non-cyclical understanding of politics clashes with widely held Andean beliefs 
about circularity and renewal. These principles were previously taken into account when the 
constitutional draft was taking place, but were now at risk with Morales pushing his political 
project beyond the realms of the term-limited democracy laid out by the 2009 constitution. In 
article 22, much like before, the emphasis is on the Aymara cyberactivists and their  norm-
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breaking and stereotype dissolving virtual activism, as they are heralded as examples that 
Indigenous Peoples can be whatever they set themselves out to be and engage in whichever 
activities they see fit, just like the rest of Bolivians. 
The second of these positive codes appears only one time, as mentioned before, and it 
highlights, in article 20, the power Indigenous groups, associations and social movements had 
at the time of the drafting of the Plurinational constitution, which has since been eroded 
drastically, which goes not without mention in the very same article. 
8.4.4 Identity Frame 
The Identity Frame is the largest in Página Siete by far, accounting for almost a third of all 
the frames, at 29,6%, with 150 coded occurrences. It is the largest of the identity frames and 
also the largest frame of any of the frames in any newspaper. The frame is almost evenly split 
when it comes to negative and positive codes, though there are still slightly more negative (77) 
than positive ones (73). 
The negative codes (“Indigenous Peoples’ identity negatively”, “Denying Indigenous 
Peoples’ identity markers”, “Pre-Columbian identity negatively” and “Indigenous 
identity opposed to Criollo/Western”) can be divided into two groups based on the frequency 
in which they occur; the first and last account for 26 and 28 occurrences, respectively, and the 
intermediate two contain 17 and 6 coded instances, correspondingly. The first of these four 
codes is quite heavily concentrated, with article 7 accounting for 17 of the 26 coded instances, 
as only one article had more than two coded occurrences. Article 7 highlights how Indigenous 
Peoples, their identity and their traits have been despised and shunned since the early formation 
of the country, in both the colonial era as well as during the initial stages of the Republic, with 
“European traits” being preferred and upheld as the desirable goal to achieve and strive for. It 
explains how “whiteness”, seen here not necessarily through the race prism but mainly as what 
the author terms “symbolic capital”, has been perpetuated by those which see themselves as 
“white”, through taste, education, and political power, at least until Morales’ breakthrough in 
2006, which shook the social norm of “discrimination enacted by the “white” status against the 
“cholo” and “Indigenous” statuses”26. Article 21, on the other hand, reinforces the mixed 
identity of Bolivians, rejecting the dichotomy which has led to the polarization between 
 
26 In the original, “la discriminación ejercida por el estatus “blanco” contra los estatus “cholo” e “Indígena”. 
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Indígena and mestizo amplified by Morales, which promotes a discourse of Indigenous 
homogeneity and purity. 
The second negative code (“Denying Indigenous Peoples’ identity markers”) appears 17 
times, again with article 7 comprising of the highest number of coded situations, with five, 
followed by article 18, with three. The former, again, lists the ways in which Indigenous Peoples 
have been historically denied the right to their own identity, marginalised throughout the 
centuries, whereas the latter focuses on the dangers represented by the government’s economic 
development program, which threatens Indigenous Peoples’ communities and lands. 
The third negative code (“Pre-Columbian identity negatively”) is the least common 
individual code of this frame, appearing only six times. The coded instances, however, were 
quite powerful in the message conveyed, urging Indigenous Peoples not to be stuck in time, 
living a past 500 years old (Article 2), and condemning the Bolivian State by accusing it of 
inventing the “myth of the Indigenous” (Article 4) for its own political legitimization. 
The last negative code (“Indigenous identity opposed to Criollo/Western”), by contrast with 
the previous one, was the most common of all individual codes in the Identity Frame. It was 
coded 28 times and found in ten different articles, with, once again, article 7 leading the way in 
number of occurrences, with eight, followed by article 22, with four. Article 7 highlights how 
Indigenous Peoples were seen historically as the antithesis of the “whites”, the former incapable 
and unfit and the latter as models and barometers to aspire to, whereas article 22 brings forth 
the tale of an Aymara, whose experience of feeling deprived of his own language, and by 
extension, his own understanding of the world portrays an identity which is in stark contrast 
with the westernised worldview which he was force-fed through education and indoctrination 
as the only one acceptable. 
The positive codes of this frame (“Indigenous Peoples’ identity positively”, 
“Ascribing/relaying Indigenous Peoples’ identity markers”, “Pre-Columbian identity 
positively” and “Indigenous identity equated/related to Criollo/Western”), on the other 
hand, appeared in somewhat equal numbers, with 24, 13, 14, and 22 coded instances, 
respectively. The first three of these codes are heavily concentrated, with the previously 
highlighted article 22 being the most coded article in all of them, with twelve, three, and nine 
coded instances, respectively. The article portrays Indigenous Peoples in a very positive light, 
highlighting their activism, agency, and social participation, inspired by their identity as 
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Aymara. The last of the positive codes, on the other hand, appears concentrated in articles 2 
and 19, which account for 10 of the 22 coded instances. The first of these articles rejects the 
Indio and Indígena tags, as they label one as inferior and are not an identity per se, pointing out 
how access to education has helped the many Indigenous Peoples feel on par with those seen 
before as culturally different. It defines Indigenous Peoples as “a blend of what was in this part 
of the world before 1532 and what had arrived with the bearded invaders”27, urging readers to 
refute and refuse the cries to “hate the invaders” and instead see themselves as the result of the 
encounter between invaded and invaders. The second article conveys a similar message, this 
time focused on the political game of identity; it rejects Morales’ insistence in the Indigenous-
mestizo binary opposition, and the framing of those against Morales, the politician, as against 
the Indígena, instead appealing to all Bolivians not as Indigenous or non-Indigenous, but as 
citizens of a democracy. 
In sum, the Identity Frame in Página Siete was perhaps the most balanced of all frames, with 
a healthy dose of both negative and positive occurrences; while identity is indeed a big part of 
the representation of Indigenous Peoples, the newspaper attempted to re-appropriate the 
discourse which Evo Morales has largely monopolised, trying to frame Indigeneity not just as 
a Manichean polarised discourse but as a constant dialogue between acknowledging the 
negative past, appreciating the immense improvements already achieved, and how there can be 
a steady walk towards a more even and fairer nation, which sees Indigenous Peoples as fully 
entitled and enfranchised citizens, with agency to shape, mould and engage with their own 
identity. 
8.4.5 (De) Colonisation Frame 
The (De) Colonisation Frame was the third biggest frame in Página Siete, behind only the 
Identity and the (Political) Agency frames. It was coded 86 times, corresponding to an even 
17% of the total frames. Its negative codes (“Decolonisation as negative/difficult”, 
“Decolonisation as illegitimate”, and “Colonial time positively”) were found at very 
different rates, with the first two having been coded 27 and 34 instances, respectively, while 
the third one was not coded a single time, the only individual code not to have been found in 
Página Siete. 
 
27 In the original, “En general, nuestra cultura era/es una mezcla entre lo que había en esta parte del mundo antes 
de 1532 y lo que había llegado con los barbudos invasores”. 
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The first of the negative codes was present in ten different articles, with articles 5 and 21 being 
the most representative, coded five times each. Article 5 portrays Morales’ political project as 
having run its course, having gone as far as it could, with democracy being the ultimate curb 
on a decolonisation project, equating the MAS political plan, based on an Indigenous culture, 
as damaging as other “fundamentalist states”28. Moreover, this attempted re-founding of the 
state is seen as impossible due to the fact that the “the national identity was achieved by 
replacing indigenous elements with others which contributed to the formation of a wide mestizo 
middle class, beyond races and ethnic markers”29. Article 21 conveys a similar message, going 
a step further, claiming that the “liberation” of Indigenous political forces has led not to their 
emancipation but has turned them into a new kind of bourgeoisie, now struggling to 
accommodate Indigenous ideas and a capitalistic logic. 
The second negative code was found 34 times, making it the fourth most common individual 
code in Página Siete. Although it is also present in a great number of articles (nine), it is also 
concentrated in a handful, with articles 4 and 21 containing nine and five coded occurrences, 
respectively. While the coded instances in article 21 are the same as in the previous code, article 
4 expounds a critique of the State’s usage of Vivir bien, how the concept is used as lipstick on 
the proverbial capitalistic pig, as a political manoeuvre and an ethical and moral balm for a 
government trying to balance an extractivist economy with the ideals and notions advocated by 
Indigenous Peoples. It criticises how the term has been politicised for personal gain and 
delegitimises any attempt to frame decolonisation with Vivir bien. Article 6, tagged three times 
with this code, echoes a similar sentiment, advocating for a real systemic change rather than a 
masked decolonisation attempt under the guise of Suma Qamaña, for the MAS’ own political 
gain. This article conveys a similar message to that posited previously in section 5.1., as it was 
written by Pedro Portugal, one of the Bolivian authors whose take on decolonisation was 
mentioned in said section of this thesis. 
The positive codes (“Decolonisation as positive/possible”, “Decolonisation as legitimate”, 
and “Colonial time negatively”) are much scarcer than their negative equivalents, as they 
appear 5, 5, and 15 times, respectively, for a meagre total of 25 coded occurrences. The first of 
 
28 In the original, “En otras latitudes del mundo, la necesidad de refundar los Estados con base en los criterios 
últimos de la cultura originaria, la fe religiosa o la tradición tribal derivaron inexorablemente en regímenes 
fundamentalistas” 
29 In the original, “un fundamentalismo étnico en Bolivia es imposible, sobre todo porque la construcción de la 
identidad nacional se logró por la sustitución de elementos indígenas por otros que contribuyeron a la formación 
de una amplia clase media mestiza, más allá de las razas y los marcadores étnicos” 
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these codes appears in four different articles, with article 6 being the only one coded more than 
once; this article portrays decolonisation as possible, but under a different guise, going deeper 
and more profoundly in reshaping the State, “overcoming the inherited colonial structures and 
replacing them with others”, fit for today’s Bolivia30. In a sense, decolonisation is possible, but 
not as it was previously conceptualised by the Morales government. 
The second positive code of this frame also appears in four articles, this time with article 7 
being the only one coded on multiple occasions. According to this article, decolonisation is 
legitimate based on the structural inequalities and injustices of yesteryear which still exist 
today; in a sense, decolonisation must be the diluting of those systemic differences which have 
concentrated political, economic, and social capital in the hands of the few (the criollos) to the 
detriment of the many (the Indigenous and mestizos). 
The last positive code appears more times than the previous two combined, with its 15 coded 
occurrences being distributed between seven different articles. Much like in other newspapers, 
this code is found in articles which delve into the inequalities Indigenous Peoples have endured 
throughout the centuries, in particular during the pre-Republican era. Articles 2 and 10 are those 
with the most coded, with four coded instances each, illustrating the negative aspects of living 
under a colonial regime, how the sense of inferiority was drilled into the Indigenous psyche and 
how that is still seen today, a feeling which both articles try to dismantle by bringing forth the 
possibility of re-negotiating identities and re-appropriating concepts and traditions, 
incorporating aspects from both sides in a dialectic dance with no predetermined lead.  
Like the majority of the frames in Página Siete, this frame is quite negative, with less than a 
third of the coded occurrences being coded positively. 
8.4.6 Responsibility Frame 
This frame is the smallest in Página Siete, with only 50 coded occurrences, accounting for only 
9,9% of the total frames. As previously mentioned, this frame is the most overwhelmingly 
negative, with 88% of the coded paragraphs being thusly. 
 
30 In the original, “la descolonización debe ser la superación de las estructuras heredadas de la Colonia y su 
reemplazo por otras adecuadas a los derechos y tiempos actuales”. 
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The negative codes (“Responsible for a particular situation” and “Affected by a particular 
situation”) combined for 44 coded occurrences, with the former accounting for 9 and the latter 
for 35 (making this code the second most common individual code in Página Siete). The first 
code was found in five articles, with articles 2, 3 and 13, having the most coded instances, with 
three, two, and two, respectively. Article 2 blames the colonial system for denigrating 
Indigenous Peoples and stigmatising them as inferior to the their European colonisers; article 3 
faults the extractivist mentality governments in Latin America have and how that impacts 
Indigenous Peoples negatively, whereas article 13 deems the MAS government culpable for 
disregarding Indigenous Peoples and having conceded power back to “the white-mestizos”. 
The second negative code was the most widespread of all the codes, as it was found in thirteen 
different articles, besides being the second most common individual code. However, this code 
was concentrated mainly in four texts, as articles 3, 7, 13 and 18 contained five, six, five, and 
five coded instances, respectively. Article 3 is dedicated to the fact that, despite being the 
groups of people with the best track record when it comes to environmental preservation, 
Indigenous Peoples are still not part of a climate change mitigation discussion and policies, 
instead being those which suffer the most from decisions and activities most harmful to the 
environment. Article 7 describes the ways in which enduring structures of racism and inequality 
inherited from the colonial and the republican era still impair and harm Indigenous Peoples 
today,  whereas article 13 highlights how the monopolising of Indigeneity and the discourses 
on Indigenous Peoples by Evo Morales and the MAS government has actually affected 
Indigenous groups negatively, as it has effectively shunned them from political agency and 
prevented other, perhaps more radical, forms of political organisation from coming to fruition. 
Article 18, similarly to article 3, highlights the dangers and perils which Indigenous 
communities face, in this case from the insistence of the MAS government in disregarding 
Indigenous and protected lands for economic gains, with the TIPNIS case being the thorniest 
of these abuses. 
The positive codes (“Solved a particular situation” and “Benefitted from a particular 
situation”), on the other hand, appear only six times, with the former being coded four times 
and the latter only twice. The few positive instances of the first code appear in article 3, with 
Indigenous Peoples’ extensive and successful track record on environmental preservation being 
lauded and praised, as deforestation as effectively been halted within Indigenous lands in the 
Amazon. The second code appears only in article 2, which highlights the ways in which 
Indigenous Peoples benefitted from the 1952 National Revolution, the first of many political 
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changes which led to the enfranchisement of Indigenous Peoples, as it was after the revolution 
that citizenship was granted to Indigenous groups. 
8.4.7 Conclusion 
Página Siete was the publication with the most negative framing of all newspapers, more so 
than El Deber, with a ratio of negative to positive coded occurrences of 1.8, with 327 instances 
of the former and only 179 of the latter. Much like in El Deber, there was a certain tendency to 
frame Indigenous Peoples as easily manipulated victims, more often than not by Morales and/or 
his cronies, though not to such an extent, as the qualm seems to be more with the MAS 
government and his political usage of Indigenous Peoples as tokens (without their approval or 
agreement) and his monopoly of the discourse on what it means to be Indigenous, solely for 
political purposes. The discourse seems to seek to promote a different type of Indigeneity, one 
which can be more radical and detached from the State’s monopoly. Overall, the tone is not 
completely sympathetic to Indigenous Peoples, which are framed under a negative light more 
often than not, but mostly in relation to Indigeneity, perhaps more so due to the aforementioned 
State’s monopoly on the discourse. Similar to other publications, it is hard to disentangle 
Morales, the politician, from Morales, the Aymara, though not to such an extent as in other 
overwhelmingly negative newspapers, like El Deber. 
The most common frames in Página Siete are the Identity and the (Political) Agency frames, 
which together represent almost half of all the frames found (49%), which emphasised 
Indigenous Peoples’ participation in political affairs, their right to contest and reshape concepts 
and notions of Indigeneity, as well as some topics which have been integral parts of the Morales 
period, such as Vivir bien and decolonisation. Though none of these two frames was coded 
positively (only the Credibility Frame was), the relation between positive and negative codes 
was the least pronounced in comparison with all other frames, with the Identity Frame in 
particular being almost evenly balanced, with most negatively coded occurrences of Indigenous 
Peoples’ identity mentioning past abuses and how they still linger today, either by direct 
discrimination or more profoundly embedded systemic inequalities, following a trend found in 
the other newspapers. 
Other frames were not so even-keeled, particularly the Conflict and the Responsibility frames, 
which, as with in other publications, tend to overlap and go hand-in-hand; the former was 87% 
negative and the latter was at 88%, with a combined 104 negatively coded occurrences, in 
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contrast with only 15 positive equivalents. In most cases, the blame was either laid at the feet 
of the government for not respecting Indigenous Peoples (and personally in the hands of Evo 
Morales) or at the colonially-infused past, which created such a profoundly unequal society, 
which disproportionately benefits the non-Indigenous, criollo minorities. 
Similar to El Deber, Página Siete refuses the dichotomic understanding of identity in general 
and of indigeneity in particular, instead urging the readers to defuse and dismantle such notions 
in favour of embracing a national identity which incorporates all Bolivians, balancing out a 
melange of practices, ideas, traditions and logics which partly derive from both the New and 
Old Worlds. It does not refuse, unlike El Deber, the notion of decolonisation and its prevalence 
to even the balance of power in Bolivia, though it advocates for a decolonisation which doesn’t 
pit Bolivians against Bolivians; in many ways, it is sympathetic to an approach which tries to 
move beyond simplistic dualistic contrasts, which inevitably replicate the same patterns of the 
colonial past, alienating a segment of the population. 
It defines Indigenous Peoples as part of a democratic Bolivia, free to express themselves and 
their views and claims and demands, but not to deviate from Western liberal democracy, as that 
is portrayed also as the only acceptable system of (national) government. An example of the 
strength of this ideal is the comparison between Morales’ government in Bolivia to autocratic 
regimes, though these remained unnamed and only vaguely alluded to. In many ways, it begs 
the question if that is in itself a new type of colonialism, as the irreducible and almighty nation-
state as it is now constituted in the Western world seems to be the only possible way forward. 
9 Conclusion 
The analysis of the results brings forth a variety of different conclusions regarding the main 
questions of this thesis. The results show a wide variety of representation regarding Indigenous 
Peoples in Bolivia; whereas some publications are overtly pro-Indigenous, some come across 
as anti-Indigenous, or at the very least anti-Morales (it isn’t always clear where one ends and 
the other begins), with some being heavily negative whereas others were mainly positive. 
The data analysed revealed that the Identity frame was the most prevalent of all frames, being 
the most representative in three of the four newspapers analysed, with La Razón being the only 
exception (although even in this publication the aforementioned frame was only 1% away from 
being the most common one), accounting always for at least 22% of the total frames found in 
  75 
each publication. This frame was portrayed under many different lights and with some 
contrasting results; whereas in Cambio the Identity frame was overwhelmingly pro-Indigenous 
and relied on dualistic interpretations, the same frame in El Deber was decidedly not and 
promoted the idea of a completely mestizo Bolivian society, accusing some (Morales, in 
particular) of being too partial to Indigenous Peoples’ demands, effectively downplaying them. 
At the same time, La Razón was tremendously positive and pro-Indigenous in their casting of 
identity, without endorsing the Manichean and “us Vs them” discourse promoted by the State, 
whereas Página Siete conveyed an almost evenly balanced  portrayal of this frame (in regards 
to positive and negative codes), combating the MAS monopoly on indigeneity, promoting a 
more revolutionary understanding of Indigenous identity and openly admonishing using ethnic 
divisions to pity Bolivians against Bolivians. 
Some other frames were more unevenly dispersed; the Credibility frame, for instance, was 
always coded at 10% or less of the totality of frames within a certain newspaper, with the 
exception of El Deber, in which this frame constituted 17% of the total. Whereas the credibility 
of Indigenous Peoples was seldom a topic in the remaining three publications, El Deber 
recurred to this frame extensively in order to discredit Indigenous persons, or groups, and to 
denigrate their abilities to handle situations and behave appropriately, putting into question their 
own “Indianness” on multiple occasions (especially that of Evo Morales) or their capacity to 
fulfil governmental roles, for example. 
Other frames were heavily tilted towards one side, with very little balance between the 
prevalence of negative and positive codes; somewhat expectedly, the Conflict and the 
Responsibility frames were overwhelmingly negative, with only the Conflict frame of La 
Razón being coded positively. The former frame was never coded higher than the fourth most 
common frame in each of the respective publications, while the latter was the second most 
prevalent frame in both Cambio and El Deber (representing more than 21% of all frames in 
both), the more openly partial and politicised newspapers analysed. The negative features of 
these two frames were best illustrated in Página Siete, when the ratio of negative to positive 
codes was almost of 9 to 1. There was also a temporality aspect when it came to these frames 
in the articles analysed in all publications, as the inescapable ghost of the colonial era and the 
profoundly real disenfranchisement endured by Indigenous Peoples loomed large. It is 
particularly hard to disentangle the fact that the criollo and mestizo societies were built upon 
the de-structuring of the Indigenous one previously in its place. Reflecting exactly that, most 
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of the Conflict frame occurrences refer to times of the past more so than today, even though 
not exclusively. 
The (De) Colonisation frame is perhaps the one with the biggest “swings” in terms of 
prevalence across the different newspapers; whereas it was the second most common in La 
Razón, at 22%, and the third most common in both Cambio and Página Siete, at 21% and 17%, 
respectively, it was the least common frame in El Deber, accounting for only 7% of the totality 
of frames. It was almost entirely positive in both La Razón and Cambio, while it was negative 
in El Deber and in Página Siete. While this negative occurrence of the (De) Colonisation frame 
was common to both, the ways in which decolonisation was portrayed was quite different; 
whereas El Deber rejected the possibility of a decolonising national project (also reflected in 
the little importance given to the topic in the first place), Página Siete conveyed a message of 
being pro-decolonisation, albeit not under the terms and manners being conducted by the MAS 
government. It is the way in which the decolonisation attempts are being undertaken which 
garners the negative depiction from the latter newspaper, once again challenging the State and 
its powerful grip on indigeneity discourses. 
Lastly, the (Political) Agency frame was also relatively volatile when it came to prevalence; it 
was the most common frame in La Razón (at 23%), the second most in Página Siete (at 19%), 
and the fifth most common in both Cambio and El Deber (at 12% and 14%, respectively). It 
was overwhelmingly positive in both Cambio and La Razón, while it was negative in the 
remaining two newspapers. Regardless of the overall prevalence of positive or negative codes, 
it was always code 11 (“Does the article emphasise Indigenous Peoples’ lack of resources 
for pursuing a desired action?”) which stood out the most, persistently highlighting the 
shortage of cultural, economic, and social capital amassed and at the disposal of Indigenous 
Peoples in Bolivia, regardless of how positively or negatively their political agency was 
portrayed in the publication. 
Each outlet’s representation of Indigenous Peoples followed a different script, according to 
their own stances and their political goals and agendas. Cambio followed a dualistic and 
confrontational line of thought, trying to, as Roberto Choque puts it, recover the history, 
identity, self-esteem and ancestral values of the Indigenous Peoples (Choque 2011: 43) to guide 
decolonisation, by portraying Indigenous groups as the “icons of a new plurinational society 
(Postero 2013: 17), in an attempt to build different epistemologies and means of knowledge 
(Ranta 2014). However, this dualistic discourse led to the publication occasionally reproducing 
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“the images and practices of display that commodify, exoticise or spectacularise” (Villarreal 
2014: 91) Indigenous Peoples, monopolising the indigeneity discourse and sometimes acting 
as a mirror of the repressive and oppressive tactics of the pre-plurinational past, by presenting 
a binary discourse which pits Indigenous Peoples (pure and pre-contact) against non-
Indigenous Bolivians (remnants of the colonial past). 
El Deber, on the other hand, reproduced some ideas which have been criticised by many as 
perpetuating the republican criollo national project of European-inspired “enlightenment” 
(Unzueta 2000), blending surreptitious attacks on Indigenous Peoples with politically charged 
attacks on Evo Morales and the MAS. The publication tried to denigrate Evo’s political project 
by delegitimising both the grassroots and Indigenous movements behind it (Quintanilla 2014), 
constantly framing Indigenous Peoples as easily manipulated, irrational and unreasonable 
(Lupien 2013), themselves victims to Morales’ misdeeds. At the same time, it resorted to using 
a discourse which tried to defuse cries of discrimination by claiming that all Bolivians are 
mestizos and that no group should demand “special” treatment (Ströbele-Gregor et al. 1994). It 
represented Indigenous Peoples only as tokens used by Morales for his own political gain, and 
only favourably when they either represented the aforementioned “authentic”, forest-dwelling 
Indian (Lucero 2006), the “sanitised, non-subversive and simplified”, mestizaje-embracing 
indio permitido (Oviedo 2014: 65), non-politicised and criollo-approved, or when they were 
openly against the MAS political project or any action taken by it. 
La Razón’s portrayal of Indigenous Peoples was the least politically charged and perhaps the 
most positive. The newspaper put forth a tremendously favourable representation of Indigenous 
Peoples’ political agency and participation, highlighting the massive positive changes that 
occurred in the last few decades in regards to the incorporation of Indigenous groups into the 
nation’s fabric and towards decolonisation. It did so without omitting the many problems and 
the rampant inequality which still exists in the country. Much like Cambio, it portrayed 
Indigenous identity overwhelmingly positively and Indigenous Peoples as role models for the 
future of a Plurinational Bolivia (Postero 2013). While it didn’t go as far as Cambio in 
advocating for a dualistic view on identity politics, La Razón repeatedly stressed the progress 
made and the steps into the right direction that had been led by Evo Morales. 
Página Siete, lastly, was perhaps the most ambiguous of all publications. While it sometimes 
portrayed Indigenous Peoples, like El Deber, as easily manipulated and gullible, it advocated 
for a more radical understanding of indigeneity and of decolonisation, rejecting the MAS-
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sponsored monopolised discourse on indigenous identity, and refusing to pit Bolivians against 
Bolivians, adhering to Patricia Chávez’s and Pedro Portugal’s premise that “using indigenous 
mythology and a discourse of recovering its culture to create a timeless image of itself would 
be another way of reproducing a colonial outlook” and “an obstacle to decolonisation” (Chávez 
2011: 17). In a way, Página Siete framed the MAS-backed decolonisation as overly negative, 
advocating instead for self-representation (and self-understandings of indigeneity), which plays 
a key role in a (real) process of decolonisation (Rodríguez 2007). At the same time, it conveyed 
a balanced image of Indigenous Peoples identity, valuing it while at the same time rejecting the 
State’s claims of ethnic purity and duality, in an enfranchisement attempt to liberate Indigenous 
Peoples and indigeneity from the oppressive discursive shackles of the MAS. 
My own research encountered a few limitations and barriers to the completion of a more 
thorough analysis; as an illustrative example, the fact that only 6,20% of Bolivians had access 
to internet when Morales first assumed office in 2006 (a number which had risen to 41,9% by 
2016, the first year of analysed data) reveals the narrow scope of this research, as Internet access 
and usage was still relatively marginal and so was the outreach of the newspapers’ online 
publications and content. However, by the conclusion of this study, the internet usage in Bolivia 
had risen to 77,5% of the population, meaning that future researches will benefit from a more 
representative access to online resources.  
Another limitation encountered during this study was the inability to measure adequately the 
salience and the proportionality of the total coverage dedicated to this topic, namely because 
such a study would be out of the scope and reach of this analysis, but also because it would be 
a gargantuan inquiry, even though it could provide a much better understanding of how 
Indigenous Peoples are represented in Bolivia. Additionally, perhaps a thorough article-by-
article analysis can provide a different outlook on the matter, as the salience, importance and 
weight of certain frames is hard to measure and quantify. The importance of other media, 
namely television and radio, could also be studied in regards to representations of Indigenous 
Peoples, as its ubiquity and discourse-shaping power are perhaps superior to that of printed 
media and their respective online access repositories, even though the latter seem to be gaining 
ground at a frantic pace, much like all over the world, as media moves to a mainly web-based 
reporting. 
In sum, Bolivian media, to some extent, still reproduces the same “essentialized construction” 
of Indigenous Peoples as “relics of the Pre-Columbian past” (Lazar 2008: 9, quoted in Ranta 
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2014: 59). Whether it is the State’s newspaper, Cambio, falling victim to the binary opposition 
discursive trap which ossifies an idea of Indigenous Peoples, or El Deber’s vehement denial of 
the need to incorporate Indigenous demands for fairness, justice and equality, by hiding behind 
an all-diluting mestizaje claim, representation of Indigenous Peoples is still guided by 
conflictive premises which fail to account for all the elements of the Plurinational fabric. The 
less politically charged publications (like La Razón) seem to convey a more even-keeled 
portrayal of Indigenous Peoples, focusing on the “good things”, the successes and achievements 
of Indigenous groups in regards to social, political and economic aspects, accepting their central 
role in the new Plurinational Bolivia and the need to keep on diminishing and eliminating 
structural inequalities and ingrained imbalances, racism and biases. Página Siete, lastly, 
presents perhaps the most sound and fairest representation of Indigenous Peoples; its frame 
distribution reveals it puts Identity, Political Agency and Decolonisation at the forefront of the 
public discourse, refusing to use Indigenous groups as tokens and advocating for a more status-
quo challenging indigeneity, inclusive and non-divisive, appealing to a rejection of binary 
oppositions between sections of the Bolivian society, stoking patriotism above ethnic-inspired 
notions of purity, like those promoted by MAS. 
In short, this study illustrates the social duality that coexists sometimes paradoxically in many 
places in Latin America and markedly in Bolivia. On the one hand, some perpetuate the idea 
and stereotype of a pure and precolonial Indigenous to be wielded as a political shield of sorts, 
a tool for personal electoral gain and advancement, whilst at the same time replicating a 
similarly colonial discourse which frames non-Indigenous as a contrasting and lesser “other”, 
ostracising sects of its own population; on the other hand, others portray Indigenous Peoples as 
symbols of backwardness, a past to be overcome on the constant march towards “development”. 
Another aspect which this research brings to light is the deeply polarised and politicised 
discourse which permeates these newspapers. As vehicles of information, the publications 
analysed convey heavily biased stances, widening the gap between one side and the other in an 
already deeply divided society like Bolivia’s. This polarisation acts as a tool of division, stoking 
flames of conflict and eroding the fertile middle grounds of dialogue, debate and compromise. 
Indigenous Peoples’ representations in Bolivia are, therefore, quite divergent, even amongst 
bigger and mainstream outlets, creating their own kind of echo chamber; depending on the 
media consumed and the sociopolitical predispositions of the readers, two quite divergent 
portrayals are real and coexist side by side. This very contradiction could be an object of future 
studies, in an attempt to study what is the role of the media in broadening social divides. This 
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is especially true in a society like Bolivia, where the differences between the “haves” and the 
“have-nots” are stark and the media is openly and partially biased, enacting a role that is more 
opinion-based and less informative than the common canons of journalistic objectivity.  
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11 Appendices  
Articles 
Cambio  
1 – Caquingora, el pueblo milenario que conserva su templo de Piedra hace cinco siglos (14/04/2018) 
2 – Bolivianos despiden el alma de sus difuntos preservando la tradición (03/11/2017) 
3 – Bartolina Sisa, la Virreina de los indios, la generala (12/10/2017) 
4 – Asumió primer gobierno indígena de Raqaypampa (04/01/2018) 
5 – Los retratos de Bartolina (24/08/2017) 
6 – Dos millones de mujeres indígenas celebran su día (05/09/2017) 
7 – Lucha por la igualdad desde la educación (09/09/2017) 
8 – UNIBOL Aymara tituló a 816 profesionales (13/11/2017) 
9 – La escenificación memoria Katari dio vida a los héroes indígenas (30/11/2017) 
10 – La Universidad Casimiro Huanca titula a 239 nuevos profesionales (23/12/2017) 
11 – El movimiento indígena le ha devuelto a Bolivia su dignidad (30/03/2018) 
12 – Jumbate, la batalla de los indígenas Yamparas que arrasó con el ejército realista (25/03/2018) 
13 – La Chola Paceña se proyectará como mujer emprendedora (02/07/2016) 
14 – La mujer indígena en la colonia (25/08/2016 
15 – Santos Marka T’ula: Cacique apoderado y escribano indígena (08/09/2016) 
16 – Minerismo e indigenismo (08/09/2016) 
17 – Mancharisqa no es depresión (03/11/2016) 
18 – El paradigma de la civilización del indio bueno (22/09/2016) 
 
El Deber 
1 – Chiquitos. Las raíces compartidas (22/04/2018) 
2 – Los ‘guardianes’ del Amazonas preservan la esencia de su casa sagrada (22/04/2018) 
3 – Sacha, de Chaparina a Guta (20/04/2018) 
4 – Evo en la ONU – Indígenas deben organizarse para recuperar el poder (16/04/2018)  
5 – Evo participa en foro en EEUU en el que indígenas denunciarán la vulneración de derechos (16/04/2018) 
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6 – …Cara a cara 07/04/2018) 
7 - El disfraz de la integración (15/03/2018) 
8 - ¿Vivir en ciudades y seguir teniendo mentalidad exclusivamente rural? (27/03/2018) 
 9 – A 12 años, decadencia y autoritarismo 23/01/2018 
10 - Declaran patrimonio cultural a dos cabildos indígenas velasquinos (25/01/2018) 
11 - Gobierno busca la nueva clase media citadina y opositores van al choque frontal (26/01/2018) 
12 - García Linera, ¿falso profeta o prestigioso intelectual? (26/01/2018) 
13 – La vieja práctica del entrismo político (01/02/2018) 
14 – El peligroso racismo (01/02/2018) 
15 – ¡Son políticos y son la derecha! (01/02/2018) 
16 – Designación de embajadores (03/02/2018) 
17 – Antiguas palabras andantes (05/02/2018) 
18 – El binomio Evo – Álvaro (04/03/2018) 
19 – Las ciudades en el escenario político boliviano (27/02/2018) 
20 – Por qué a pesar de las leyes promulgadas por Evo Morales, a los indígenas se les sigue discriminando por 
su idioma en Bolivia (19/04/2018) 
 
La Razón 
1 – El Gobierno asegura que la justicia indígena ‘goza de buena salud’ y no será parte de la Cumbre (29/03/2016) 
2 – Exigen que el exmagistrado Cusi deje de vestir poncho de líder indígena (01/06/2017) 
3 – Charagua empieza su autonomía indígena (01/01/2016) 
4 – El primer gobierno indígena en Bolivia nace el 8 de enero, un día antes se acreditará a sus autoridades 
(14/12/2016) 
5 – Con ofrenda a la Pachamama se inicia cumbre de Comunicación Indígena en Tiquipaya (15/11/2016) 
6 – Etnia guaraní forma el primer gobierno autónomo indígena del país (13/09/2016) 
7 – En 7 años, 38 regiones impulsan la ruta de la autonomía indígena (06/11/2016) 
8 – Hugo Siles: Charagua indígena es un modelo único en el mundo (04/04/2016) 
9 – El rostro indígena de América Latina (21/02/2016) 
10- David Crispín Espinoza: Exconcejal, asesor indígena (04/01/2016) 
11- Un alivio navideño para la pobreza en Bolivia (24/12/2017) 
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12 – Autonomías indígenas – cada uno de estos autogobiernos indígenas expresa de manera diferente su identidad 
(24/07/2018) 
 
Página Siete 
 1 – Resistencia y desarrollo de los pueblos indígenas (15/10/2017) 
2 – Quechua, pero no indio ni indígena (29/10/2017) 
3 – Indígenas, los mejores aliados contra el cambio climático (17/11/2017) 
4 – La mixtificación populista del “vivir bien” (26/11/2017) 
5 - ¿El fin del Evismo? (28/11/2017) 
6 – Y si se tratara de otra cosa la descolonización? (30/11/2017) 
7 – La blanquitud como estatus (24/12/2017) 
8 – Asqueado (30/12/2017) 
9 – Alasita y globalización (03/01/2018) 
10 – La fiesta popular y la nación (07/01/2018) 
11 – La democracia en Bolivia (07/01/2018) 
12 – La clase media en la calle (07/01/2018) 
13 – Dictadura del falso indígena y de un k’ara (17/01/2018) 
14 – Racismo y democracia liberal (21/01/2018) 
15 – El racismo como medio (21/01/2018) 
16 – Los auténticos decadentes (21/01/2018) 
17 – Tacanas reabren casa cultural para preservar su historia (29/01/2018) 
18 – Indígenas tejen alianzas para hacer frente al desarrollismo (20/10/2017) 
19 – Lo peor que nos podría pasar (23/02/2018) 
20 – Constituyentes ya vetaron reelección indefinida en 2007 (22/10/2017) 
21 - ¿Es Bolivia una sociedad abigarrada? (06/09/2016) 
22 – El ciberactivista aymara (11/09/2016) 
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Table of codes, dimensions, and frames 
 
Dimension 
Number 
Item – To detect the particular dimension of the frame at the paragraph level 
Conflict Frame 
1 (negative) Does the article describe confrontations/disagreements between Indigenous Peoples and 
institutions? 
2 (positive) Does the article describe how Indigenous Peoples or institutions with different interests have 
reached an agreement about something? 
3 (negative) Do Indigenous Peoples and institutions reproach one another? 
4 (positive) Does the article describe how Indigenous Peoples and other groups/ideologies can coexist 
peacefully? 
Credibility Frame 
5 (negative) Does the article contain expressions of concern or doubt as to whether Indigenous Peoples 
can handle/be trusted regarding an issue/problem because of some difficult 
circumstance/situation? 
6 (positive) Does the article emphasise Indigenous Peoples’ ability to handle an issue/situation despite 
difficult circumstances? 
7 (negative) Does the article evaluate how Indigenous Peoples are acting/behaving worse than expected 
in a particular situation? 
8 (positive) Does the article evaluate how Indigenous Peoples are acting/behaving according to or above 
expectations in a particular situation? 
(Political) Agency Frame 
9 (negative) Does the article describe Indigenous Peoples’ political agency negatively (or as being 
excessive)? 
10 (positive) Does the article describe Indigenous Peoples’ political agency positively (or lacking)? 
11 (negative) Does the article emphasise Indigenous Peoples’ lack of resources for pursuing a desired 
action? 
12 (positive) Does the article emphasise Indigenous Peoples’ degree of sufficient or abundant resources 
for pursuing a desired action? 
Identity Frame 
13 (negative) Does the article present Indigenous Peoples’ identity markers in a negative light? 
14 (positive) Does the article present Indigenous Peoples’ identity markers in a positive light? 
15 (negative) Does the article deny identity markers to Indigenous Peoples? 
16 (positive) Does the article ascribe identity markers to Indigenous Peoples? 
17 (negative) Does the article mention pre-Columbian identity markers negatively/as 
illegitimate/undesirable? 
18 (positive) Does the article mention pre-Columbian identity markers positively/as legitimate/desirable? 
19 (negative) Does the article present Indigenous identity as opposed to Criollo/Western identity? 
20 (positive) Does the article equate/relate Indigenous identity to Criollo/Western identity? 
(de) Colonisation Frame 
21 (negative) Does the article describe a negative/difficult way towards achieving decolonisation? 
22 (positive) Does the article describe a positive/possible way towards achieving decolonisation? 
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23 (negative) Does the article frame decolonisation as illegitimate? 
24 (positive) Does the article frame decolonisation as legitimate? 
25 (negative) Does the article mention the colonial time positively? 
26 (positive) Does the article mention the colonial time negatively? 
Responsibility Frame 
27 (negative) Does the article suggest that some group/institution is/should be held responsible for a 
particular situation? 
28 (positive) Does the article credit some group/institution with having solved a particular situation? 
29 (negative) Does the article describe how Indigenous Peoples have been/are affected by a particular 
situation?  
30 (positive) Does the article describe how Indigenous Peoples have benefitted/benefit from a particular 
situation?  
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Frames and codes 
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